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ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE AND THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
BY GRACE M. GIESELt
ABSTRACT
The United States legal system has a new player: the alternative liti-
gation finance (ALF) entity. In recent years ALF entities have begun
providing financing for small-scale matters and also complex commer-
cial matters involving millions of dollars. The recent success of ALF has
been assisted by the fact that at least in some jurisdictions it is now clear
that perceived historical barriers to ALF such as champerty, usury, and
ethics precepts do not, in fact, block ALF. With ALF arrangements be-
coming more commonplace, questions have emerged about the effect the
integration of ALF entities into attorney-client relationships has on the
attorney-client privilege.
This Article explores traditional attorney-client privilege doctrine to
determine whether the privilege protects communications involving ALF
entities. This Article concludes that ALF entities cannot benefit from the
joint client doctrine because they, in fact, are not joint clients. Even if
ALF entities sought o be joint clients, ethical principles likely would not
allow joint client status in the investment decision stage of the relation-
ship and might not allow it in the monitoring stage of the relationship.
ALF entities likely cannot benefit from the allied party-common interest
doctrine for communications in the investment decision stage but might
be able to avail themselves of this doctrine for communications in the
monitoring stage if the particular court involved uses a broad definition
of common interest. In addition, an ALF entity would not likely be found
to be an agent of the client or lawyer such that privilege protection would
include it. Ultimately, this Article concludes that privilege doctrine
should not be stretched to reach the ALF scenario because to do so
would damage the privilege itself. Rather, if the involvement of ALF
entities in the legal market is sufficiently beneficial and if there is a suf-
ficient need for privilege protection, an independent ALF privilege might
be the best solution.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States' legal system has a new player: the alternative lit-
igation finance (ALF) entity.' Funding of litigation by an entity that is
not a party to the litigation has long existed in the United States in the
form of attorney funding through contingent fees2 and insurer funding
through the typical liability insurance contract.3 In situations in which
those two avenues of third-party funding have not been available, parties,
large and small, sophisticated and not, often have struggled to fund their
own litigation. Today such parties have an additional option: ALF. ALF
refers to funding of litigation "by entities other than the parties them-
selves, their counsel, or other entities with a preexisting contractual rela-
tionship with one of the parties."4 ALF entities have no interest or in-
volvement in the matter before providing funding but provide funding for
the litigation and reap a return if the funded party is successful.
ALF entities have been successful in other countries for many
years.s In the last decade or so, ALF entities in the United States have
funded small matters such as personal injury claims.6 And in the last five
I. For a sampling of matters in which ALF entities have been involved, see Devon IT, Inc. v.
IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.l (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012), concerning a fraud
action between two commercial entities, S & T Oil Equip. & Mach., Ltd. v. Juridica invs. Ltd., 456
F. App'x 481, 482-84 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), involving international arbitration, and Shanks v.
Morgan & Meyers, P.L.C., No. 302725, 2012 WL 1314094, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2012)
(per curiam), in which a personal injury plaintiff received funding from two ALF entities.
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2013) (stating ethical guidelines for
contingency fees); see also Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 99
(2011) (noting that all U.S. jurisdictions recognize contingency fees). Though the attorney is inter-
ested in the litigation, he or she funds the litigation but is not a party. Thus, the attorney is a third-
party funder.
3. Insurers are interested in the litigation involving the insured but are not a party to the
litigation so they are third-party funders. See Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the
Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms when the Deal
Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1833-34 (2013) (noting similarity of ALF entities and insur-
ers).
4. AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 1 (2012) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics2020/20111212ethics2020a
If whitepaper final hod informational report.authcheckdam.pdf; see also STEVEN GARBER,
RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE LAW, FIN., AND CAPITAL MKTS. PROGRAM, ALTERNATIVE
LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS ix (2010),
available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasionalpapers/2010/RAND OP306.pdf.
5. The United Kingdom and Australia have been ahead of the United States in the establish-
ment and acceptance of alternative litigation funding. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of
Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 178, 185 (2014); see also MICHAEL LEGG, U.S. CHAMBER
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA: IDENTIFYING AND
ADDRESSING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR LAWYERS 3 (2012), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/l/LitigationFundinginAustralia.pdf (dis-
cussing IMF and the Australian experience). In the United Kingdom, a voluntary code of conduct
has been created along with an Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales. See Caro-
line Binham, Code of Conduct Set Up for Litigation Funders, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 23, 2011,
at 4.
6. See, e.g., Kelly, Grossman & Flanagan, LLP v. Quick Cash, Inc., No. 04283-2011, 2012
WL 1087341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) (an example of a typical situation); see also Maya
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years or so, ALF entities, some of which are offshoots of successful enti-
ties in the United Kingdom or Australia,7 began providing financing in
the United States for large commercial matters.8 A sophisticated market
of litigation investing has emerged in which ALF entities invest in mat-
ters such as contract disputes, real estate disputes, trade secret disputes,
and environmental disputes.9 These ALF entities are answering a need.'0
Some of these entities are answering that need in a manner that allows
for quite a profitable return.11
The recent success of ALF has been assisted by the fact that at least
in some jurisdictions it is now clear that perceived historical barriers to
ALF such as champerty, usury, and ethics precepts do not, in fact, block
ALF activities. In recent times, many jurisdictions have viewed champer-
ty, the act of "maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the
Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268,
1277 (2011) (discussing the small scale type of ALF).
7. For example, Juridica Investments, Ltd. and Burford Capital, LLC, financing entities
investing in litigation in the United States, are traded on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
which is a part of the London Stock Exchange. See Richard Lloyd, The New, New Thing, AM. LAW.
(May 17, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202457711273; see also Jason
Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding ofAmerican Litigation, 58 UCLA L.
REv. 571, 573 (2010) (discussing Burford and Juridica). Australian veteran funder IMF launched a
United States subsidiary in 2011, Bentham Capital LLC. See LEGG, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing
IMF).
8. See Catherine Ho, Investment Firms Playing Role in Legal Field, WASH. POST, Dec. 12,
2011, at A14 (discussing ALF entities BlackRobe, Burford, and Juridica); Leigh Jones, Another
Litigation Finance Firm Opens Its Doors, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 2013,
http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/id=1202595145560? ("Three prominent lawyers and a hedge-
fund manager have launched [Gerchen Keller Capital LLC, an ALF] with $100 million in capital.").
9. See Jones, supra note 8 (noting that Gerchen Keller Capital LLC averages investments of
$5 million); Eileen Malloy, Third-Party Financing for U.S. Litigation Profitable Endeavor for U.K.
Funding Firm, 28 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 229 (Apr. 11, 2012) (discussing the
success of one such funder of sophisticated commercial disputes, Burford); Molot, supra note 5, at
178 ("Burford has committed more than $ 300 million in capital across more than fifty deals involv-
ing commercial disputes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and international arbitration.").
For an example of ALF involvement in a trade secret litigation matter, see Miller UK Ltd. v. Cater-
pillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
10. Before ALF entities, a corporation might dedicate significant corporate resources to fund
litigation matters. This use might infringe on the resources available to achieve other important
corporate objectives. With the ALF market, corporations seek to involve ALF entities to fund litiga-
tion and yet avoid the diversion of corporate resources. The ALF entity funds the litigation. In addi-
tion, because ALF entities are not repaid absent a successful result, corporations using ALF can
avoid, at least in part, the risk of pouring money into an unsuccessful itigation. In its Annual Report
released in April 2011, ALF entity Burford noted "[w]hile uncertain economic conditions, rising
litigation costs and shrinking corporate [legal] budgets have helped generate interest in Burford's
proposition, the fundamental driver of [Burford's] success ... has simply been a thirst for financial
options." See Malloy, supra note 9 (quoting BURFORD ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 4 (2012),
http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/burford-arl1.pdf) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
11. For example, in April of 2012, Burford reported a $15.9 million profit for 2011 and noted
that it had committed $280 million in investments. Id. Juridica has also shown signs of being in-
volved in a profitable endeavor. In January of 2012, it announced a stock payout as a result of suc-
cess in seven antitrust and patent matters. See Alex Spence, The £8m Slice of Courtroom Winnings,
with More to Come; Juridica to Pay Out Special Dividend Next Month, TIMES (London), Jan. 5,
2012, at 39.
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outcome," 2 with great suspicion13 and have not recognized it as a crime
or a tortl4 or even a contract defense.5 An example of the typical recep-
tion for a champerty claim is in a case in which ALF arrangements were
at issue. The court stated:
[O]ur Courts have held for at least a century that an outsider's in-
volvement in a lawsuit does not constitute champerty or maintenance
merely because the outsider provides financial assistance to a litigant
and shares in the recovery. Rather, "a contract or agreement will not
be held within the condemnation of the principle[s] . . . unless the in-
terference is clearly officious and for the purpose of stirring up 'strife
and continuing litigation."' 6
The ABA's Commission on Ethics 20/20 agreed in 2012 that chain-
perty was not a barrier to ALF in many states. 17 The Commission clari-
fied that if a jurisdiction allows any sort of investment in litigation, an
ALF arrangement would not be champertous in such a jurisdiction if the
matter is not frivolous litigation, the ALF entity has no improper motive,
and the ALF entity does not exercise control over strategic decisions.'8
ALF investments are motivated by a desire to create profit, so it is un-
likely that an ALF entity would invest in frivolous litigation' 9 or be mo-
tivated by any otherwise improper motive. In addition, an ALF entity
desiring to maximize profit would not jeopardize the investment by seek-
12. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978). This case also defined maintenance and
barratry, two doctrines related to champerty. "(M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit." Id.
"[B]arratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty." Id.
13. See Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The
consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not expanding, champerty's reach."); see also
Giambattista v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 586 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) ("In no state
are these doctrines and the laws relating to them preserved with their original rigor.").
14. See, e.g., Del Webb, 652 F.3d at 1154 (finding no tort); Sec. Underground Storage, Inc. v.
Anderson, 347 F.2d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 1965) (finding no tort); Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830-31
(Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding no champerty crime).
15. See, e.g., Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277-79 (S.C. 2000) (abol-
ishing champerty as a defense to contract enforcement); Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224,
1226-28 (Mass. 1997) (same); see also Sebok, supra note 2, at 98-99 (stating that at least twenty-
eight U.S. jurisdictions allow champerty in some form).
16. Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Smith v.
Hartsell, 63 S.E. 172, 174 (N.C. 1908)); see also Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d
711, 724-28 (N.D. 111. 2014) (rejecting application of champerty and maintenance to ALF setting,
stating "maintenance and champerty have been narrowed to a filament"); Core Funding Grp. v.
McIntire, No. 07-4273, 2011 WL 1795242, at *3-4 (E.D. La. May, 11, 2011) (holding that a loan to
attorneys to fund litigation was not champertous because it was not a loan to a party and not contin-
gent solely on the underlying litigation's outcome); Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No.
018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (finding no impermissible
champerty). But see Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 676, 678, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding an ALF arrangement champertous and not enforceable).
17. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at I1.
18. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at I1; see also Sebok, supra note 2, at 108-09 (discuss-
ing the various forms of champerty permitted and not permitted).
19. See William Alden, Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2012, at B3 ("[ALF entities] insist they only invest in cases that they believe have
merit.").
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ing to exercise so much control over the matter that the arrangement
would be deemed champertous such that it would not be enforced.20
ALF arrangements also are permissible under usury laws. Usury
prohibitions apply only when there is a loan at an interest rate above that
allowed by usury law and the borrower agrees to repay the principal and
pay the interest without condition.21 ALF arrangements usually involve a
conditional obligation on behalf of the borrower to repay; the ALF entity
recovers its money only if the litigation resolves favorably.22 As a result,
most courts evaluating whether ALF arrangements are usurious have
concluded that the arrangements are investments, not loans, and are not
usurious.23
Repeatedly, ethics bodies have determined that ALF arrangements
are not per se unethical.24 These bodies raise caution flags, not stop signs,
as they note that attorneys must protect their independence in ALF ar-
rangements,25 that attorneys must guard against conflicts of interest,26
20. For example, Burford has stated that it "is simply a provider of investment capital and ...
the litigant retains control of its case." Malloy, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Michele DeStefano posits that a rule not allowing any ALF influence would not be realistic. Michele
DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2796 (2012).
21. See Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. 205, 226 (1830) ("Where a loan is made to be returned at a
fixed day with more than the legal rate of interest, depending upon a casualty which hazards both
principal and interest, the contract is not usurious; but where the interest only is hazarded, it is usu-
ry."). See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles,
I DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 85, 89-92, 96 (2002) (discussing the history of usury laws and how
modem usury laws apply to litigation financing).
22. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People's Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56
MERCER L. REV. 649, 665 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Kelly, Grossman & Flanagan, LLP v. Quick Cash, Inc., No. 04283-2011, 2012
WL 1087341, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) ("[T]he Defendants were always at risk of no
recourse whenever one of the underlying cases went to trial and resulted in no recovery. Such cir-
cumstances simply cannot be stated to constitute a 'loan."'); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 97 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that borrowers had no obligation to repay so
"as a matter of law, the agreements cannot be usurious"). A few courts have disagreed. See, e.g.,
Lawsuit Fin., LLC v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam) (ALF ar-
rangement entered into after the favorable jury verdict so repayment was certain); Echeverria v.
Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (holding
that the claim was a "sure thing" so the repayment was certain to occur and the arrangement was
usurious (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767,
777-79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the advance was usurious). See generally Jenna Wims
Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and a Proposal to Bring Litigation
Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750, 761-62, 769-
72 (2012) (discussing the relationship of litigation lending to usury laws).
24. See, e.g., Del. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 2006-2 (2006), available at
http://media.dsba.org/ethics/pdfs/2006-2.pdf ("[T]the Attorney may comply with such an arrange-
ment under the proper circumstances."); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Ethics
Op. RI-336 (2005), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered-opinions/ri-
336.cfm ("The various State Bar ethics opinions have concluded that litigation-financing arrange-
ments similar to those described above are permissible, as long as it is the lawyer, and not the client,
who is the obligor on the loan, and there is full disclosure to the client.").
25. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2012-3 (2012), available
at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/2012/Op_1 2-003.pdf
("[T]he lawyer must ensure that the ALF provider does not attempt to dictate the lawyer's represen-
tation of the client."); N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011), availa-
2014] ALF AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 101
and that attorneys must be ever vigilant to protect confidential client in-
formation at all times in the ALF setting.27
With ALF arrangements becoming more commonplace at all levels
of litigation, questions have emerged about the effect the involvement of
an ALF entity in a litigation matter has on the work product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege.28 The courts have not yet fleshed out these
2 0issues. 9 Commentators have not engaged in in-depth analysis either.30
Because these two doctrines are not creatures of state professional re-
sponsibility rules, state ethics opinions do not definitively address the
application of these doctrines, but rather, note that lawyers should ex-
plain to clients that disclosure to ALF entities may waive the attorney-
client privilege or the work product doctrine. 31 Obviously, these doc-
ble at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/20 I1-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-201 1-
02 ("While a client may agree to permit a financing company to direct the strategy or other aspects
of a lawsuit, absent client consent, a lawyer may not permit the company to influence his or her
professional judgment in determining the course or strategy of the litigation, including the decisions
of whether to settle or the amount to accept in any settlement."). Several Model Rules prohibit
improper interference. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013) (stating that "a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice"); id. R. 5.4(c)
(stating that a lawyer shall not allow interference); id. R. 1.8(f)(2) (stating that a third party can pay
only if there is no improper interference).
26. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011), available
at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/20 11-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-2011-02
(cautioning about conflicts of interest); Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 191 (2006), available
at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebaroverseers thicsopinions&id=8734
8&v=article (instructing lawyers to "be wary of conflicts of interest"). Model Rule 1.7 prohibits,
absent informed consent, a representation if there is a "significant risk" that the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client will be "materially limited" by the lawyer's relationship with another such as the
ALF entity. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013).
27. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2012-3 (2012), available
at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/2012/Op_12-003.pdf (pro-
hibiting disclosures to an ALF without client consent and instructing lawyers to warn clients about
the risk of waiver of the attomey-client privilege); N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, For-
mal Op. 2011-2 (2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/201 I-
opinions/I 159-formal-opinion-2011-02 (emphasizing that client consent is necessary before disclo-
sure); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 31-32. Model Rule 1.6 requires informed consent
unless the disclosure is impliedly authorized or in certain very narrow situations of necessity.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013).
28. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 7, at 604 ("One largely unanswered question raised by oppo-
nents of third-party finance is how it affects attomey-client privilege and the work product rule.").
29. With regard to the work product doctrine, see Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F.
Supp. 3d 711, 734-39 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying the work product doctrine); Bray & Gillespie
Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-CV-222-Orl-35KRS, 2008 WL 5054695, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 17, 2008) (holding that the work product doctrine did not apply because claimant did not
make specific claims in accord with court's standing order regarding privilege); Mondis Tech., Ltd.
v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304, at *2-3
(E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011) (applying the work product doctrine).
30. Commentators have noted the issues but have not fully analyzed the application of the
doctrines in the ALF setting. Compare Steinitz, supra note 6, at 1324 ("Client communication with
the financier . . . breaks the attomey-client privilege."), with Richmond, supra note 22, at 675 ("it is
far from certain that an attorney's disclosure of client confidences to a litigation funding company
will waive the attomey-client privilege") and Sebok & Wendel, supra note 3, at 1837 n. 11 (noting
uncertainty).
31. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. E-432 (2011), available at
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e432.pdf
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trines protect certain material from disclosure and that protection is vital-
ly important to the attorney-client team and to the ALF entity consider-
ing an investment or an ALF entity already invested in a matter.32 Re-
gardless of the stage of the ALF entity involvement, it is likely that the
matter's value is maximized by the protection these doctrines offer.
Thus, the attomey-client team and the ALF entity must have as a goal the
preservation of the protection. This goal should affect attorney, client,
and ALF entity conduct in any one matter and should affect how the
ALF market operates as well.
The application of the work product doctrine and the attorney-client
privilege must be evaluated in light of the sharing of information that
might be typical when an ALF entity is involved. First, an ALF entity
must have access to information about a matter so that the entity can
decide whether to invest in the matter or, rather, to walk away from the
matter.33 Few ALF entities would be willing to make a significant in-
vestment absent some level of due diligence activity.34 In fact, estab-
lished ALF entities have detailed due diligence procedures that include
analysis of the claim's potential for success, the claim's potential value
after adjudication, the ability to collect a judgment if the matter is suc-
cessful, the litigation's potential cost, the time span involved to obtain a
final judgment, and the likelihood and timing of settlement.35 In addition,
the ALF entity, if it decides to invest, will desire access to information
("Any consultation should include a discussion of the possible effects of disclosure of confidential
information to the non-lawyer, including the risk of waiver of the attomey-client privilege.").
32. For example, the managing director of Juris Capital Corporation, an ALF entity, in 2009
noted:
[I]n every conversation I have with a litigant or their counsel, we advise them not to share
the information which is or may be subject to a privilege. We never ask for, nor do we re-
ceive, any privileged information that if disclosed to us might constitute a waiver of the
attomey-client privilege.
Jennifer Banzaca, In Turbulent Markets, Hedge Fund Managers Turn to Litigation Funding for
Absolute, Uncorrelated Returns, HEDGE FUND L. REP., June 24, 2009 (internal quotation mark
omitted), available at
http://www.juriscapitalcorp.com/images/Hedge%20Fund%2OLaw%20Report%20Article.pdf (dis-
cussing Juridica, Juris, and CaseFunding); see also Mathew Andrews, Note, The Growth of Litiga-
tion Finance in DOJ Whistleblower Suits: Implications and Recommendations, 123 YALE L.J. 2422,
2443-44 (2014).
33. Jonathan Molot, chair of the investment committee at Burford, describes this process as
follows:
Litigants approach Burford's team of legal professionals asking whether their cases are
financeable. Burford's legal team then conducts extensive diligence that includes an ex-
amination of the facts of the dispute, the governing law and forum, the quality of the legal
team the litigant has hired or proposes to hire, and the respective financial resources of
the parties.
Molot, supra note 5, at 178; see also Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160,
at *1 n.l (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (describing sharing information with the ALF entity in the eval-
uation process).
34. See Andrews, supra note 32, at 2437 ("Funders have argued that the quickest road to
bankruptcy is funding suits without a reasonable chance of success.").
35. See Andrews, supra note 32, at 2437-38; Banzaca, supra note 32.
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about the matter so that it may monitor its investment as the matter pro-
ceeds.
In a recent article I attempted to fill the analysis void with regard to
the work product doctrine and concluded that materials created specifi-
cally for the ALF entity likely enjoy work product doctrine protection,37
and that sharing materials otherwise protected by the work product doc-
trine with the ALF entity likely does not result in a waiver of the work
product doctrine.38 Thus, I ultimately concluded that the work product
doctrine would not significantly affect the nature of ALF involvement in
the attorney-client relationship and would not significantly affect the
ALF market in general.
I now turn to the effect of ALF entity involvement on the attorney-
client privilege. In a simplistic analysis, involving an ALF entity in at-
torney-client communications destroys the privilege because a person
other than the attorney and client is present40 and any communication
with an ALF entity is not a communication between attorney and client,
the type of communication the privilege protects.4 1 Likewise, in a sim-
plistic analysis, any attorney-client communications privileged when
made but shared with an ALF entity loses the privilege's protection be-
cause the communication is shared with someone other than attorney and
client.42
But the question of the attorney-client privilege's application to sit-
uations involving ALF entities is not so simple. After a brief discussion
of the privilege's parameters in Part I, this Article identifies four ways
the attorney-client privilege might protect communications involving or
shared with ALF entities. In Part II, this Article examines whether the
ALF entity and the client are the attorney's joint clients such that the
privilege protects the communications involving or shared with the ALF
entity. In Part III the Article discusses whether ALF entities and clients,
though not joint clients, share a common interest such that the allied par-
ty-common interest doctrine protects communications involving ALF
entities from compelled disclosure. Part IV evaluates whether ALF enti-
ties are the clients' agents under the functional equivalent agent doctrine,
36. See Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of
Litigation Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POLY 673, 677-78 (2012) (discussing monitoring role).
37. Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine, 47
wAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1126-29 (2012).
38. Id. at 1137-39.
39. Id. at 1140.
40. See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) ("A communica-
tion is not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its
attorney, or their agents are present.").
41. See infra Part LA for a discussion of the parameters of the privilege.
42. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("[Tlhe
voluntary production of a privileged document to a third party waives the privilege."); WebXchange,
264 F.R.D. at 126 ("[I]f a client shares an otherwise privileged communication with a third party,
then the communication is no longer confidential and the client has waived the privilege.").
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or the clients' agents or the lawyers' agents under the Kovel agency doc-
trine4 3 such that the communications involving ALF entities enjoy the
privilege's protection. The Article examines, in Part V, whether existing
privilege doctrine should be modified to reach the ALF scenario to the
extent it does not reach it now.
The Article concludes that the only claim of privilege that might be
successful, and then only in some courts, is the claim that the privilege
applies to protect communications involving ALF entities in the monitor-
ing stage as a result of the allied lawyer-common interest doctrine. ALF
entities cannot benefit from the joint client doctrine because they, in fact,
are not joint clients. Even if ALF entities sought to be joint clients, ethi-
cal principles likely would not allow joint client status in the relation-
ship's investment decision stage and might not allow it in the relation-
ship's monitoring stage. ALF entities likely cannot benefit from the al-
lied party-common interest doctrine for communications in the invest-
ment decision stage but might be able to avail themselves of this doctrine
for communications in the monitoring stage if the particular court in-
volved uses a broad definition of common interest. ALF entities would
not likely be able to benefit from the functional equivalent agent doctrine
or the Kovel agency doctrine. Ultimately, this Article concludes that giv-
en that the current privilege doctrine does not protect communications
involving ALF entities, the doctrine should not be stretched to reach the
ALF scenario because to do so would damage the privilege itself. Rather,
the Article posits that a free-standing ALF privilege might be called for if
the involvement of ALF entities in the legal market is sufficiently bene-
ficial and if there is a sufficient need for privilege protection.
I. THE PRIVILEGE
A. Parameters and Rationale of the Privilege
The modem attorney-client privilege protects certain communica-
tions from compelled disclosure." The privilege protects confidential
communications between clients and their lawyers if the communications
are for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice and are not in
furtherance of a crime or fraud.45 Some courts state the privilege's defini-
43. 1 name this doctrine after the case most often associated with it, United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
44. See Kerner v. Superior Ct., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) ("The privi-
lege is absolute and prevents disclosure of the communication regardless of its relevance, necessity
or other circumstances peculiar to the case."); Batra v. Wolf, 922 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) ("Privileged attorney-client communications are absolutely immune from disclosure.").
45. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe defined the privilege as follows:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be-
come a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of
the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of secur-
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tion slightly differently or provide more detail, but as one court has stat-
ed: "Five elements are common to all definitions of the attorney-client
privilege: (1) an attorney, (2) a client, (3) a communication, (4) confiden-
tiality anticipated and preserved, and (5) legal advice or assistance being
the purpose of the communication."4
Courts recognize that the application of the privilege may impede
truth-finding, and so courts often warn that the privilege must be con-
strued narrowly.47
The privilege exists to encourage clients to communicate fully and
completely with their lawyers. The reasoning is that clients will be more
likely to confide in their lawyers if they know that what they tell their
lawyers is protected from compelled disclosure. Only with a client's
complete disclosure can an attorney render competent and proper legal
48advice and assistance. And only with that advice and assistance can
clients structure their conduct to better abide by the bounds of the law.
B. The Problem Created by an ALF Entity's Involvement
Modern definitions of the attorney-client privilege note that the
privilege protects communications that are confidential and stay confi-
ing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some
legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id.; see also Chase v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., No. 1-61290-ClV, 2012 WL 2285915, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
June 18, 2012) (applying the United Shoe test); Go v. Rockefeller Univ., 280 F.R.D. 165, 173
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying the United Shoe test). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68-86 (2000) (defining the scope and duration of the attorney client
privilege). Some jurisdictions such as New York have codified the privilege. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R.
4503(a) (Consol. 2014).
46. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (E.D. La. 2007).
47. See, e.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[B]ecause ...
this rule 'contravene[s] the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man's evi-
dence,' we construe it narrowly to serve its purposes." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980))).
48. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) ("[The privilege] is founded upon the
necessity, in the interest and administration ofjustice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the
law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."); Castellani v. Scranton Times, LP, 956
A.2d 937, 951 (Pa. 2008) ("The attorney-client privilege, on the other hand, renders an attorney
incompetent to testify as to communications made to him by his client in order to promote a free
flow of information only between attorney and his or her client so that the attorney can better repre-
sent the client.").
49. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1980), the Supreme Court stated the privi-
lege's purpose as follows:
[The] purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and admin-
istration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully in-
formed by the client.
Id at 389; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications
between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the
administration ofjustice.").
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dential.so In its narrowest sense, a confidential communication is one
between an attorney and a client and one that does not escape beyond
those two entities.51 A conversation that does not involve an attorney and
client is not protected regardless of confidentiality. A conversation in the
presence of others is not confidential5 nor is a conversation between an
attorney and client that is later shared with another.53 So, as an initial
matter, an ALF entity's presence in the midst of attorney-client commu-
nications seems to prevent the privilege from attaching to the communi-
cations. Likewise, sharing any privileged communications with an ALF
entity would seem to destroy the privilege's protection. Any communica-
tion with an ALF entity by an attorney or client, therefore, would not
appear to be a communication between attorney and client and, thus,
would not enjoy the privilege's protections.
Yet, there are some wrinkles to the privilege that may make such
conclusions suspect. If one views the ALF entity and the client as the
lawyer's joint clients pursuing a common interest, including the ALF
entity in communications or sharing communications with the ALF enti-
ty does not destroy the privilege's protection. Second, if the relevant
court recognizes that the ALF entity and the client share a common inter-
est, including the ALF entity in communications or sharing communica-
tions with the ALF entity does not destroy the privilege's protection.
Third, if the ALF entity is a special type of agent of the lawyer or client,
including the ALF entity in communications or sharing communications
with the ALF entity does not destroy the privilege's protection.
50. See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:18
(4th ed. 2013); 1 PAUL R. RICE, AT7ORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6:1 (2013-
2014 ed. 2013).
51. See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) ("A communica-
tion is not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its
attorney, or their agents are present."); see also In re Condemnation in 16.2626 Acre Area, 981 A.2d
391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) ("Confidentiality is key to the privilege, and the presence of a
third-party during attorney-client communications will generally negate the privilege.").
52. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 289 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[1]f persons other than
the client, its attorney, or their agents are present, the communication is not made in confidence, and
the privilege does not attach." (quoting In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir.
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. See In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[V]oluntarily
disclosing privileged documents to third parties will generally destroy the privilege."); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1996) ("By voluntarily disclosing her
attorney's advice to a third party, . . . a client is held to have waived the privilege because the disclo-
sure runs counter to the notion of confidentiality."); United States v. Ghavami, 882 F. Supp. 2d 532,
537 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("It is well-established that voluntary disclosure of confidential material to a
third party generally results in forfeiture of any applicable attorney-client privilege.").
106 [Vol. 92:1
2014] ALF AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
II. JOINT CLIENT DOCTRINE
A. What Are Joint Clients?
The law has long recognized that a lawyer may represent two or
more parties with regard to the same matter.54 The parties may desire to
proceed together as a unit, as a way to capture efficiency of tasks and
cost. These parties seek representation by the same attorney, and they
seek a shared representation.55 In a shared or common representation,
often called a joint or co-client representation, the attorney represents
the clients as a group, and they agree to be jointly represented for pur-
poses of a common matter. All parties share all information.
In addition to the inherent limitation that parties do not want a joint
representation unless the interests of the parties closely align, ethics rules
limit joint representations because an attorney cannot ethically represent
multiple parties jointly in a matter unless the parties' interests are similar.
Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes a
conflict if an attorney represents two parties, separately or jointly, if the
parties are "directly adverse" or "there is a significant risk that the repre-
sentation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client."59 In such a conflict situation an attor-
ney, to handle the representation, must obtain the parties' informed con-
sent.60 Even then, the lawyer cannot represent the parties unless the at-
torney "reasonably believes" that he or she can "provide competent and
54. See Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 466, 479 (D.
Del. 2012) ("The rules governing attorney-client privilege have evolved to cover the representation
of two or more people by a single lawyer, a joint representation. In a joint representation, the joint
privilege applies when multiple clients hire the same counsel to represent them on a matter of com-
mon interest."). The practice has long occurred. See, e.g., Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P.2d 258, 261 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (explaining that representing clients jointly is "common practice"); Rice v.
Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 335-36 (1854); Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N.J. Eq. 516, 516-17 (1885).
See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Three's a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 387, 395 (2001) ("Joint representation has been a longstanding practice in which the
potential benefits have been emphasized, while the potential dangers have been downplayed.").
55. Clients see a joint representation as cost-effective, and it allows for an amicable relation-
ship with the joint client and facilitates a "united front" approach to the matter. Teresa Stanton
Collett, The Promise and Peril of Multiple Representation, 16 REV. LITIG. 567, 577 (1997) ("[T]he
ability to present a united front to a common foe presents substantial tactical advantages that cannot
be ignored."); see also Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV.
211, 226-27 (1982) (noting the advantage of a "united front").
56. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 50, § 4:30 (explaining "joint clients"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000) (defining the privilege of "co-clients").
57. See Maplewood Partners, LP v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 594 (S.D. Fla.
2013) ("There is no need to evaluate whether the legal interests of such co-clients are in common or
aligned because the clients are joint clients of a single attorney."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 cmt. c (2000) (discussing the creation of the joint client
representation).
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. 1 (2000)
("Sharing of information among the co-clients with respect to the matter involved in the representa-
tion is normal and typically expected.").
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2013).
60. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
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diligent representation to each affected client," no law prohibits the rep-
resentation, and no client is asserting a claim against another client in a
proceeding before a tribunal.6 '
A comment to Rule 1.7 cautions any attorney considering a joint
representation to "advise each client that information will be shared and
that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some mat-
ter material to the representation should be kept from the other." 62 The
lawyer also should explain that he or she may not favor one joint client
over the other.63
Parties logically should not seek joint representation if their inter-
ests do not converge. Rule 1.7 provides a conflict of interest threshold of
commonality. The disclosure discussed in the Rule's commentary makes
it more likely that the parties will understand the situation so that they
can more properly evaluate whether their interests converge to the extent
that a joint representation would be desirable.
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Joint Clients
The attorney-client privilege protects communications involving
joint clients and the lawyer from compelled disclosure when the commu-
nication is about the joint representation and the one seeking the disclo-
sure is a third-party to the joint representationi4 If one of the clients
communicates with the lawyer about the matter of shared representation,
the privilege attaches even though another joint client is present. If one
of the clients communicates with the lawyer about the matter of shared
representation and later shares that communication with another joint
client, there is no waiver of privilege. In effect, in these two situations,
the communication is confidential and retains its confidential status be-
cause it is not being shared with an outsider to the relationship of attor-
61. Id. R. 1.7(b); see id. R. 1.7 cmts. 29-32.
62. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (noting that in special situations clients can agree that the attorney will
not share certain information).
63. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 32.
64. See Vicor Corp. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 674 F.3d 1, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2012) ("Thus, when a
lawyer represents multiple clients having a common interest, communications between the lawyer
and any one (or more) of the clients are privileged as to outsiders[] but not inter sese." (quoting
FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mag-
netar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 466, 479 (D. Del. 2012) ("The
rules governing attorney-client privilege have evolved to cover the representation of two or more
people by a single lawyer, a joint representation. In a joint representation, the joint privilege applies
when multiple clients hire the same counsel to represent them on a matter of common interest.").
This has long been settled law. See Marcuse v. Kramer, 5 Teiss. 247, 250 (La. Ct. App. 1908) ("Two
or more persons sometimes address a lawyer as a common agent. So far as concerns strangers, these
communications are privileged, but not as between themselves." (quoting EDWARD P. WEEKS, A
TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW § 175 (2d ed. 1892)); 1 FRANCIS WHARTON,
A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES § 587 (1877) ("It is easy to conceive of
cases in which two or more persons address a lawyer as their common agent. So far as concerns a
stranger, their communications to the lawyer would be privileged.").
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ney and client.65 The flip side of this is that a joint client cannot claim
privilege against the other joint clients if the joint clients become adver-
saries at some time after the joint representation ends.66 In addition, one
of the joint clients cannot waive the privilege without the approval of all,
though one of the group can waive the privilege as to his or her own
communications but only to the extent that the disclosure does not reveal
protected communications of other joint clients.67
C. Is an ALF Entity a Joint Client?
While an ALF entity might seek to be an attorney's joint client
along with the client whose matter the ALF is financing, the descriptions
of ALF entity activity to date do not indicate that ALF entities seek or
desire a joint client relationship or any client relationship at all. 8 Indeed,
a study of ALF entities in Australia has noted that "[n]one of the Austral-
ian professional litigation funders approached . .. retain legal practition-
ers as clients."69 Strategically, an ALF entity might request such a repre-
sentation in the future so as to capture the benefit of the privilege's pro-
tection.
If an ALF entity seeks to be the attorney's joint client in the invest-
ment decision stage, it is not likely the attorney ethically could represent
the original client and the ALF entity. The ALF entity and the original
client have very divergent goals and interests at that stage. The ALF enti-
ty's interest is in critically evaluating the litigation matter so that the enti-
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(1) (2000) ("If two
or more persons are jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either
co-client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68-72 and relates to matters of common
interest is privileged as against third persons, and any co-client may invoke the privilege, unless it
has been waived by the client who made the communication.").
66. See FDIC, 202 F.3d at 461 ("But it will often happen that the two original clients will fall
out between themselves and become engaged in a controversy in which the communications at their
joint consultation with the lawyer may be vitally material. In such a controversy it is clear that the
privilege is inapplicable." (quoting I KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91,
at 335-36 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(2) (explaining that no privilege can
be claimed in an adversarial action between joint clients).
67. In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[A] client may
unilaterally waive the privilege as to its own communications with a joint attorney, so long as those
communications concern only the waiving client; it may not, however, unilaterally waive the privi-
lege as to any of the other joint clients' communications or as to any of its communications that
relate to other joint clients."); Maplewood Partners, LP v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550,
605-06 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (stating that a client may reveal his or her own statements but not those of
others).
68. See Boardman, supra note 36, at 687-88 ("Third-party litigation funders vary in their
stated and probable involvement in the underlying litigation. Given the newness of the funding in the
United States, it is not clear what the precise relationship between the plaintiff and the funder is
meant to be or how it actually manifests. The funder and the plaintiff, though, are clearly not co-
clients of the plaintiffs lawyer.").
69. Vicki Waye, Conflicts ofInterests Between Claimholders, Lawyers and Litigation Entre-
preneurs, 19 BOND L. REV. 225, 236 (2007). "[T]he funder does not fall within the definition of
'client' set out in the [Australian] Model rules, nor is the funder a client under general law princi-
ple." Id. at 234 (footnote omitted).
109
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ty can decide whether investing meshes with its profit maximization
goals whereas the client's interest is to obtain financing so that the litiga-
tion matter can ultimately be resolved successfully. The two parties may
very well be viewed as "directly adverse" such that the attorney would
have a concurrent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(1).7 0 The situa-
tion is definitely an arm's length transaction. There is no doubt that at the
very least there is a "significant risk" that the representation of one or the
other client "will be materially limited" by the lawyer's representation of
the other client such that there is a concurrent conflict of interest under
Rule 1.7(a)(2).71 The conflict may be such that Rule 1.7(b) does not al-
low the representation under any circumstance; informed consent cannot
solve the problem because the lawyer cannot "reasonably believe[] that
the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation"
to each client.72
The more likely result with regard to the investment decision stage
is that the lawyer ethically could not jointly represent he ALF entity and
the original client nor would either desire such representation. Thus, the
situation could not benefit from the privilege's protection.
If the ALF entity seeks a joint representation after the ALF entity
has decided to invest in the matter and thus when the ALF entity is simp-
ly monitoring its investment, the ALF entity's interests and the original
client's interests may intertwine sufficiently that the attorney could ethi-
cally handle the representation, as an attorney often represents an insurer
and an insured as joint clients.7 3 At this stage of the relationship, the ALF
entity and the original client share the goal of litigation success. If the
ALF entity and the original client were the lawyer's joint clients, the
privilege would protect all communications in pursuit of the common
interest from disclosure if those communications otherwise fell within
the privilege's definition.
Thus, communications in the relationship's monitoring stage could
be privileged if the parties and the lawyer agreed that the representation
is a joint one. In contrast, joint representation at the investment decision
stage is not likely ethically proper and thus cannot occur. With no joint
representation the privilege's benefits cannot be captured.
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2013).
71. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
72. See id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
73. Courts generally view the insurer and insured as joint clients of the attorney in a typical
liability insurance defense representation. See, e.g., Maplewood Partners, LP v. Indian Harbor Ins.
Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 595-96 (S.D. Fla. 2013); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 08-450, at 3 (2008) ("In certain jurisdictions, a lawyer engaged by an insurance
carrier to defend an insured is deemed to represent both the insured and the insurer . . . .").
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III. ALLIED PARTY-COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE
A. The Privilege as Applied to Allied Parties Represented by Separate
Attorneys
1. General Definition
Many jurisdictions in modem times recognize that the attorney-
client privilege protects certain communications among parties and their
attorneys even if the parties are separately represented when the parties
have a common interest.74 This doctrine provides an exception to the rule
that including a third party in the midst of an attorney-client communica-
tion destroys the privilege and also an exception to the rule that sharing a
communication otherwise privileged with a third party waives the privi-
lege.
This allied party-common interest doctrine was first recognized in
Chahoon v. Commonwealth76 in 1871. In Chahoon, a criminal matter, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege protected
communications by one of the defendants to or in the presence of a law-
yer for one of the other defendants.7 The court stated that "it was natural
and reasonable, if not necessary, that these parties, thus charged with the
same crimes, should meet together in consultation with their counsel,
communicate to the latter all that might be deemed proper for them to
know, and to make all necessary arrangements for the defence."7  The
court concluded that these communications, which the defendants had a
right to have, must be privileged, "[o]therwise what would such right of
consultation be worth?"79 A more modern court has exhibited the same
sentiment, stating: "The common interest doctrine protects that free flow
of information by providing that 'clients and their respective attorneys
sharing common litigation interests may exchange information freely
74. See generally Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should
Not Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 519-28 (2011-
2012) (explaining the history of the attomey-client privilege among parties with common interests);
Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not
Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 58-62 (2005) (explaining the
evolution and use of the joint defense and common interest doctrines).
75. See United States v. Ghavami, 882 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[D]isclosure
does not result in forfeiture of the attorney-client privilege when the privilege holder and the third
party share a common legal interest."); Roe v. Catholic Health Initiatives Colo., 281 F.R.D. 632, 638
(D. Colo. 2012) ("The 'joint defense' or 'common interest' doctrine is really an exception to the rule
that the attorney-client privilege is waived when the communication at issue was made in the pres-
ence of a third-party.").
76. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
77. Id. at 843. In Chahoon three men were indicted for conspiracy to defraud an estate and for
forging a note as part of the conspiracy. Id. at 834-35. After they were indicted, the three men met
with two attorneys; each of the attorneys represented one of the indicted defendants. Id. at 835. At
trial, one of the attorneys was questioned about what the third defendant had said at the meeting. The
court found any such statements privileged. Id. at 839-40.
78. Id. at 839.
79. Id. at 842.
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among themselves without fear that by their exchange they will forfeit
the protection of the [attorney-client] privilege."'80
Though other courts were slow to adopt the doctrine at first,81 many
jurisdictions now recognize some form of the doctrine82 and the issue is
frequently before the courts.83 Courts and commentators refer to the doc-
trine as the "common interest doctrine,"84 the "joint defense privilege,"85
the "community of interest" doctrine,86 the "allied lawyer" doctrine, or
some similar term.88 Just as there is disagreement about the doctrine's
name, there is also disagreement about the doctrine's parameters." The
Chahoon court first recognized the doctrine in a joint defense criminal
setting.90 Modern courts recognize it also in the civil setting.91 While
80. In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 489 B.R. 451, 470 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013)
(alteration in original) (quoting Indiantown Realty Partners, Ltd. v. Law Offices of Carla L. Brown-
Harward (In re Indiantown Realty Partners, Ltd.), 270 B.R. 532, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001)).
81. The next published opinion in the United States in which the doctrine was applied was not
until 1942. Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942) overruled on other grounds by Leer v.
Chi., Milw., St. P. & Pac. Ry. Co., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981). In Schmitt, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court applied the doctrine not in a criminal matter as in Chahoon but in a civil matter involv-
ing an automobile collision. Id. at 414. One defendant shared a report with the other defendants so
that the parties could brief admissibility as ordered by the court. The court determined that the shar-
ing of the report did not waive the privilege because the defendants were "maintaining substantially
the same cause." Id at 417. Two other courts applied the doctrine in the 1960s. See Hunydee v.
United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (explaining that the privilege applies if the state-
ments "concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in possible subsequent
proceedings"); Cont'l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding that the
privilege applied though no formal legal proceedings had begun).
82. See, e.g., In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 50-53 (Tex. 2012) (applying Texas
law); Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 280 P.3d 240, 245-46 (Mont.
2012) (applying Montana law); Titan Inv. Fund II, LP v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 09C-10-259
WCC, 2011 WL 532011, at *4-5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2011) (applying Delaware law).
83. For example, in the first six months of 2013, three reported federal district or bankruptcy
level cases address the issue. See Costello v. Poisella, 291 F.R.D. 224, 231 (N.D. Ill. 2013); In re
Fundamental Long Term Care, 489 B.R. at 470-71; Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 433-
34 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
84. See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 703 F.3d 724, 732-33 (4th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 62 (2013).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2012), amended by
No. 10-10310, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2900 (9th Cir. 2012).
86. See, e.g., Santella v. Grizzly Indus., Inc., 286 F.R.D. 478, 483 (D. Or. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
87. See, e.g., 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 5493 (1986 & Supp. 2013).
88. See, e.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) (referring to the
"'common interest' or 'joint defense' rule"); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex.
2012) (referring to the "allied litigant doctrine"). With regard to the confusion of terminology, see
Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd sub nom, Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of
Onondaga, 435 F.3d I10 (2d Cir. 2006), in which the court stated, "[The] joint defense privilege has
many monikers such as the common interest doctrine, common interest arrangement doctrine, or
pooled information doctrine. Unfortunately, courts, commentators, and attorneys use these terms
interchangeably even when they do not serve the same purpose." Id. at 236.
89. See Giesel, supra note 74, at 531; Schaffzin, supra note 74, at 65.
90. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 839-42 (1871) (considering commu-
nications involving a defendant charged with conspiracy to defraud an estate and forgery and a
lawyer representing a co-defendant).
91. See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 703 F.3d 724, 732-33 (4th Cir.
2013) (involving a dispute between corporate entities regarding the provision of housing to members
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some courts require at least a threat of litigation,92 other courts and the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement) do not
require a litigation context.93 If the context is litigation, plaintiffs as well
as defendants can benefit from the doctrine.9 4
Some courts require the parties to have agreed to cooperate in the
litigation95 while other courts do not focus such a showing.96 The courts
also disagree about he required degree of involvement of attorneys.
Some courts require the communication to have involved at least one
lawyer while others are less exacting.97 The Restatement does not require
of the military), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 62 (2013); Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 433-34
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (involving a civil defamation suit).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring the threat
of litigation); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (D. Del. 2012) (hold-
ing that litigation must be anticipated); In re XL Specialty, 373 S.W.3d at 51-52 ("Texas requires
that the communications be made in the context of a pending action."); see also TEX. R. EVID.
503(b)(1)(C) (requiring that the communication be "to a lawyer ... representing another party in a
pending action"); HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3) (containing the same "pending action" requirement); ME.
R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (containing the same "pending action" requirement). One court defends the
pending action requirement by noting that such a requirement limits the privilege "to situations
where the benefit and the necessity are at their highest, and . . . restrict[s] the opportunity for mis-
use." United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
93. The Third Circuit in In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2007),
stated, "[The doctrine] applies in civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional con-
texts." Id. at 364; see also United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 & n.6 (7th Cir.
2007) (explaining that litigation need not be actual or imminent); United States v. Gumbaytay, 276
F.R.D. 671, 674 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (stating that the privilege applies in litigated or nonlitigated mat-
ters); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (2000) (applying the
privilege to "a litigated or nonlitigated matter").
94. See United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002)
("[W]hether the jointly interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs ... the rationale for the joint
defense rule remains unchanged." (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
95. See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Servs., 703 F.3d at 733 ("[T]here must be an agreement or a meeting
of the minds. '[M]ere "indicia" of joint strategy as of a particular point in time are insufficient to
demonstrate that a common interest agreement has been formed." (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 285 (4th Cir. 2010)));
In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[A] shared desire to see the same
outcome in a legal matter is insufficient to bring a communication between two parties within this
exception, Instead, the parties must make the communication in pursuit of a joint strategy in accord-
ance with some form of agreement-whether written or unwritten." (citation omitted)). The Re-
statement seems to require an agreement in that it states that he parties "agree." See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(l) (2000). Yet, comment c to that section clarifies
that the agreement need not be a formal one. See id. § 76 cmt. c ("Exchanging communications may
be predicated on an express agreement, but formality is not required.").
96. See, e.g., BDO Seidman, 492 F.3d at 815-16 (containing no mention of agreement);
Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (containing no discussion of agree-
ment).
97. See In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 365 (discussing the requirement of
attorney involvement as a preventer of abuse since if attorneys are involved there will be sharing
only when coordination is needed); see also United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) ("The defendants would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations
among the defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of those
conversations. Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is rejected."); In re XL
Specialty, 373 S.W.3d at 52-53 ("The allied litigant doctrine protects communications made be-
tween a client, or the client's lawyer, to another party's lawyer, not to the other party itself."). But
see Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gucci, No. 07 Civ. 6820(RMB)(JCF), 2008 WL 5251989, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2008) ("If information that is otherwise privileged is shared between parties that have a
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that the communication involve a lawyer but it does require that any
communication must be "made for the purpose of communicating with a
privileged person."98 The Restatement defines a privileged person to
include the client, the client's lawyer, agents of the two who facilitate the
communication, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representa-
tion.99
2. The Common Interest Requirement
All courts agree that the privilege only applies if there is a common
interest,00 but formulations of the parameters of what that interest must
be vary.o'0 Many courts use the definition of common interest stated in
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,'0 2 which requires "that the nature
of the interest be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commer-
cial." 103
The Restatement espouses a less strict definition of common inter-
est. It requires that the communication relate to the common interest,
"which may be either legal, factual, or strategic in character. The inter-
ests of the separately represented clients need not be entirely congru-
ent."'0
Some courts stake out positions somewhere between the Duplan
standard and that of the Restatement.05 For example, in Egiazaryan v.
Zalmayev,106 the court noted that the parties "must share a common legal
interest" and that a "'personal or business oriented' interest shared with
another party is insufficient."' 07 The Egiazaryan court continued by stat-
ing that "[t]here must be a substantial showing by parties attempting to
invoke the protections of the privilege of the need for a common defense
common legal interest, the privilege is not forfeited even though no attorney either creates or re-
ceives that communication.").
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. d.
99. Id. § 70.
100. See In re Teleglobe Commc ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 364 (discussing the common interest
requirement). See generally RICE, supra note 50, § 4:35.
101. See RICE, supra note 50, § 4:36 ("There is no clear standard for measuring the community
of interests that must exist for the privilege to apply."); see also In re Fundamental Long Term Care,
Inc., 489 B.R. 451, 470 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) ("There is some dispute over how similar the inter-
ests must be for the common interest doctrine to apply.").
102. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
103. Id. at 1172 ("A community of interest exists among different persons or separate corpora-
tions where they have an identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of a communica-
tion between an attorney and a client concerning legal advice."); see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 284 F.R.D. 132, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that the interest must
be "identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial" (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. Colum-
bia Cas. Co., No. 90 Civ. 2518(MJL)(JCF), 1995 WL 5792, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1995) (internal
quotation mark omitted)); RICE, supra note 50, § 4:36 (noting that many courts use this definition).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. e (2000).
105. See, e.g., Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Mo-
bileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (D. Del. 2012).
106. 290 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
107. Id. at 434 (citing Yemini v. Goldberg, 821 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384 (Sup. Ct. 2006)).
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as opposed to the mere existence of a common problem."'08 While the
court did not require a "total identity of interest," it did require that "a
limited common purpose necessitates disclosure to certain parties."
Another court has required a "substantially similar legal interest, that is
not solely commercial.""0
Yet other courts add teeth to the common interest requirement by
stating that the communication must be made "in pursuit of a joint strate-
gy."II For example, in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Great Ameri-
can Insurance Co. of New York,'l2 the court required that there not only
be "a common legal, rather than commercial interest," but also that "any
exchange of privileged information was 'made in the course of formulat-
ing a common legal strategy.""'3
B. The ALF Allied Party-Common Interest Doctrine Case Law
Given the different positions taken by courts with regard to apply-
ing the allied party-common interest doctrine, the only certainty regard-
ing the doctrine's application in the ALF setting is uncertainty. Any pre-
diction of how a court might apply the common interest doctrine to a
communication among an ALF entity, the client, the client's lawyer, and
perhaps a lawyer for the ALF entity is a matter of speculation at best.
There is some guidance, however, in the form of a few court opinions in
which courts have addressed the issue with regard to ALF entities and
also in the form of court opinions applying the allied party-common in-
terest doctrine in similar, though not identical, settings.
Several reported cases involve ALF entities and claims of privilege
involving the allied party-common interest doctrine. In Leader Technol-
ogies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,'14 a patent infringement action, a court
evaluated whether a magistrate judge had erred by denying privilege
protection to communications involving an ALF entity."'5 The communi-
cations occurred when the ALF entity was deciding whether to invest in
108. Id. (quoting Finkelman v. Klaus, No. 5257/05, 2007 WL 4303538, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 28, 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. (quoting Eugenia VI Venture Holdings, Ltd. v. Chabra, No. 05 Civ. 5277 DAB DFE,
2006 WL 1096825, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. MobileMedia, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
111. E.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012).
112. 284 F.R.D. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
113. Id. at 139-40 (quoting Sokol v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 8442(SHS)(KNF), 2008 WL
3166662, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Bevill,
Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he party asserting
the privilege must show that (1) the communications were made in the course of a joint defense
effort, (2) the statements were designed to further the effort, and (3) the privilege has not been
waived."); Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 851, 855 (D. Minn. 2012) (requiring a
common legal interest and disclosure in the "course of formulating a common legal strategy" (citing
Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 201, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation
mark omitted)).
114. 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010).
115. Id. at 375.
115
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the litigation matter; Leader shared certain documents with the ALF enti-
ty so that it could better evaluate whether it wished to invest." 6 Ultimate-
ly, the funder did not invest.'"7 The court stated that the magistrate had
noted "that the state of the law regarding common interest is unsettled
and that this case presented a close question,""8 yet, the court agreed
with the magistrate that Leader had not proved a common interest and so
the attorney-client privilege did not protect the shared documents."9 The
court applied a common interest test requiring the interests to be "identi-
cal, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial." 20
In contrast, in Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,121 a court evaluated
whether the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege applied
to documents shared with an ALF entity, Burford Group LLC.1 22 Devon
shared documents with Burford so that Burford could evaluate whether
to invest in the matter.123 Before the sharing, Burford entered into a
"Common Interest and Non-Disclosure Agreement" with Devon. Bur-
ford ultimately decided to invest.125 The court determined that the shared
documents were protected by the work product doctrine and also by the
attorney-client privilege.'2 6 Sharing the documents with Burford did not
waive the privilege because Burford and Devon "now [had] a common
interest in the successful outcome of the litigation which otherwise Dev-
on may not have been able to pursue without the financial assistance of
Burford."l 27
Interestingly, the Devon court determined that the privilege applied
in a situation in which the ALF entity ultimately decided to invest and be
a continuing litigation team member, noting that as of the time of the
writing of the opinion, the ALF entity and the litigation client "now"
share a common interest. 28 The court reached this result though the shar-
116. Id. at 376.
117. See Nate Raymond, Ruling Highlights Chink in Armor of Litigation Funding, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 28, 2011, at 2.
118. Leader, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
119. Id. at 377.
120. Id. at 376 (quoting In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012).





127. Id. The issue was raised in the context of disclosure to investors in Mondis Technology,
Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304
(E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011). The court decided that the shared documents were protected by the work
product doctrine and did not reach the question of attorney-client privilege protection. Id. at *3; see
also Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-CV-222-Orl-35KRS, 2008 WL
5054695 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008) (holding that the work product doctrine did not apply and that
claimant did not make specific claims in accord with court's standing order and so there was no
privilege).
128. Devon lT, 2012 WL 4748160, at * In.1.
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ing took place in the relationship's investment evaluation stage.129 This is
in direct conflict with the result in the Leader case, in which the court
determined that he privilege did not apply to documents shared in the
relationship's investment decision stage.13 0 The only real difference be-
tween the Devon and Leader situations is that in Devon the relationship
ripened past the investment decision stage and in Leader the relationship
did not. In both cases, there was little common interest at the time of the
sharing.
The most complete treatment to date of the question of whether
communications involving ALF entities are privileged is in Miller UK
Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc.1 31 In a protracted litigation matter dealing with
allegations of theft of trade secrets,'32 Miller sought funding from several
ALF entities and ultimately secured a funding relationship with one of
the entities.133 In response to Caterpillar's request that all materials
shared with the ALF entities be produced, Miller claimed the protection
of the attorney-client privilege.' 34
The Miller court concluded that the funding documents were shared
as part of a "commercial or financial" transaction and thus the attorney-
client privilege did not apply.135 The court continued its analysis, howev-
er, by assuming "arguendo, that Miller has sustained its burden of show-
ing that the materials it provided to its lawyers for further submission to
prospective funders were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
proceed[ing] to the question of waiver."' 36 The court then addressed the
question of whether sharing with the ALF entities waived the privi-
lege.137
Miller asserted that disclosure to ALF entities did not waive the
privilege because the entities and Miller shared a common interest.
The court stated: "In this, as in most Circuits, the 'common interest' doc-
trine will only apply 'where the parties undertake a joint effort with re-
spect to a common legal interest, and the doctrine is limited strictly to
those communications made to further an ongoing enterprise.""'3 9 The
129. Id
130. Leader, 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376-77 (D. Del. 2010).
131. 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
132. Id. at 717.
133. Id. at 719.
134. Id. The court stated: "For example, on an application for funding form, Miller redacted its
response to a question that asked Miller to provide an estimate of the prospect of success of its
lawsuit, and to give the amount of its attorneys fees." Id. at 721.




139. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d
806, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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court then concluded that "[a] shared rooting interest in the 'successful
outcome of a case' . . . is not a common legal interest."'40
Acknowledging that the allied party-common interest doctrine's
purpose is to aid parties who share a legal interest in obtaining legal ad-
vice,14 1 the court noted that in the situation before it, "there was no legal
planning with third party funders to insure compliance with the law, liti-
gation was not to be averted, as it was well underway, and[] Miller was
looking for money from prospective funders, not legal advice or litiga-
tion strategies."42 Thus, the allied party-common interest doctrine did
not apply and documents shared with any ALF entity lost privilege pro-
tection.43
C. Analogous Situations
Courts' determinations regarding the allied party-common interest
doctrine in analogous but not identical situations also provide guidance.
Cases dealing with disclosures when one party is deciding to invest in
another party's matter provide guidance as to how a court might treat a
disclosure to an ALF entity when an ALF entity is deciding whether or
not to invest in the litigation matter at hand. Cases dealing with disclo-
sures when parties are negotiating sales of businesses or assets are also
useful. Cases dealing with disclosures in the context of continuing rela-
tionships provide guidance when speculating about how a court might
view a disclosure to an ALF entity when the entity has already invested
and is simply overseeing the litigation as a way of monitoring the in-
vestment.
1. Situations Similar to the ALF Investment Decision Stage
Some courts have declined to find a common interest when the dis-
closures occur in the midst of a negotiation such as a negotiation about
whether to invest or purchase an entity or asset.'" Such courts thus do
not find that the attorney-privilege applies.14 5 Other courts have reached
146 147
a contrary result. In Santella v. Grizzly Industrial, Inc., 1 the holder of
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id. at 732-33 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 733.
144. See, e.g., Coming Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D. Del. 2004)
(declining to find a common interest where the sharing occurred during negotiations for one party to
invest in the other).
145. See, e.g., Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 577-79 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(finding no common interest where a party disclosed information about patents held in an attempt to
interest investors because there was no possibility of joint litigation and the communications at issue
did not further the joint effort); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 342, 349 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (concluding that the defendant "sought commercial gain, not legal advantage, through disclo-
sure of its lawyer's advice to [third parties]"; this was a negotiation of an agreement for one party to
make and another party to buy a product made by the other party; "[t]he parties were formulating not
a 'common legal' strategy, but a joint commercial venture.").
146. See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
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the inventions and patents disclosed information relating to the inven-
tions and patents to a potential investor in the holder.148 The court de-
clined to find a common interest and thus declined to find that the attor-
ney-client privilege protected the communications.149 The court noted
that the privilege's purpose was to "encourage full disclosure to one's
attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance,, 5 and "that pur-
pose would not be enhanced by protecting [the communications] because
that disclosure was not made for the purpose of securing representation,
either for themselves or for their potential investors, but instead was
made to solicit investment capital."'5 '
In a similar setting, in Net2Phone, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,152 the court re-
fused to find a common interest and thus denied attorney-client protec-
tion when parties shared information during the negotiation of a loan that
was to be repaid from the proceeds of licensing and enforcing patents. '3
The court determined that "the purpose of the communications during the
negotiations were [sic] to entice a third-party to loan plaintiff money and
not to further a then-shared legal interest." 54 The court observed the lack
of proof of a confidentiality agreement as well as the fact that the parties
did not share "the prospect of imminent litigation."'55 The court noted
that if the negotiation had been successful and an agreement between the
parties had "come to pass, then communications to further the enforce-
ment activity may have been protectable."'56 This statement supports the
notion that in the ALF scenario, courts may recognize a common interest
after the investment decision but not before.
In Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 57 the court
evaluated whether the privilege protected disclosures about the effect of
a German patent office decision.58 The disclosures were made when the
parties were negotiating the price one of the parties would pay the other
for the patent.59 The court noted that "the parties were negotiating their
147. 286 F.R.D. 478 (D. Or. 2012).
148. Id. at 482-83.
149. Id. at 484.
150. Id (alteration to original) (quoting In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that there was no threat that the
investors would become parties to the litigation. Id at 483-84.
151. Id at 484.
152. No. 06-2469 (KSH), 2008 WL 8183817 (D.N.J. June 26, 2008).
153. Id. at *8-10.
154. Id at *10.
155. Id. ("There was neither a threat of impending legal action against them nor was there a
common adversary.").
156. Id.
157. Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 4,
2011). The Mondis court also dealt with a privilege claim regarding an ALF entity but decided the
issue on the basis of the work product doctrine, not the attorney-client privilege. Id at *3.
158. Id. at *4.
159. Id
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rights and relationships with each other, which is not covered by the
common interest doctrine." 60
Other courts have disagreed and have found a common interest in
scenarios involving investment negotiations or decisions.161 For example,
in William F. Shea, LLC v. Bonutti Research, Inc., 162 a court determined
that the privilege applied to material shared as part of "an arms-length
negotiation" as to the price one party would pay for patent-related assets
because the parties shared a common interest even though an agreement
was not reached until after the sharing occurred.163 The court pointed out
that the parties shared an interest in certain patents and in "commencing
or continuing litigation" regarding those patents.6
Similarly, in High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,16 5 during a
negotiation a party disclosed documents to parties interested in the sale
or licensing of certain patents.'66 The court found a sufficient common
interest for the privilege to apply, stating:
Although [one of the parties] and the other companies had adversarial
interests when they were negotiating the possible transfer of the pa-
tents, they still had a common legal interest in the validity, enforcea-
bility, and potential infringement of the patents-in-suit. This is suffi-
cient to establish their common interest in the communications ex-
changed. 167
Likewise, in In re Regents of University of California,168 an inventor
and patentee shared information about patents with a potential licen-
see. 1 The court found that the activity's purpose was "to support com-
mercial activity" but that the interests were intertwined and the legal
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., William F. Shea, LLC v, Bonutti Research, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-615, 2013 WL
1386005, at *2-4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2013); High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-
CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *9 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012); see also Morvil Tech., LLC v. Ablation
Frontiers, Inc., No. 10-CV-2088-BEN (BGS), 2012 WL 760603, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012)
(concluding that materials shared during negotiations for one entity to acquire assets of another
entity along with related intellectual property were protected by the privilege and that the parties
shared a common interest because "both parties were committed to the transaction and working
towards its successful completion"); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Sealed Air Corp., 253
F.R.D. 300, 310 (D.N.J. 2008) ("Defendant has established that pre-transaction they anticipated the
same claims and shared a common-interest in defending against those claims."); BriteSmile, Inc. v.
Discus Dental Inc., No. C 02-3220 JSW (JL), 2004 WL 2271589, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004)
(concluding that disclosure to seller by buyer in an attempt to understand the technology being
purchased in the transaction did not destroy privilege because both parties shared a common interest
in the analysis of the technology).
162. No. 2:10-CV-615, 2013 WL 1386005 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4,2013).
163. Id. at *2-3.
164. Id. at *3.
165. No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012).
166. Id. at *5.
167. Id. at *9.
168. 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
169. Id at 1389.
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interest was sufficient for recognition of a common interest.170 Accord-
ingly, the parties had "substantially identical" legal interests in the com-
munication's subject, which the court identified as valid and enforceable
patents because of the "potentially and ultimately exclusive nature of the
[parties'] license agreement."7 1
2. Situations Similar to the ALF Monitoring Stage
At the relationship's monitoring stage, the ALF entity has decided
to invest and has aligned itself financially with the client. The ALF entity
likely will want to monitor that investment by monitoring the litiga-
tion.172 Communications may occur that involve the ALF entity and oth-
erwise privileged material may be shared with the ALF entity as part of
that monitoring process. Some courts addressing the allied party-
common interest doctrine in similar settings have found a common inter-
est and so have found that the doctrine applies such that the attorney-
client privilege protects the communications at issue. 173
a. Xerox Corporation v. Google Inc.
A most helpful case is Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc.,174 in which the
patent holder shared information about the patents with the entity the
patent holder had contracted with for the patents' licensing, commercial-
170. Id. at 1390.
171. Id. Perhaps some courts finding a common interest and applying the privilege in situations
that are arms' length or close to it are less concerned about the effect of a broadly applied privilege
and more concerned about promoting commercial goals. One court seems to make this plain by its
own words. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1987), in-
volved the negotiation of a sale of a business. During the negotiation the seller disclosed an attorney
opinion letter regarding a patent's validity to a prospective buyer. Id. at 308. The sale ultimately did
not occur. Id. at 310. The court determined that the privilege protected the opinion letter from disclo-
sure as the result of the allied party-common interest doctrine. See id. at 310-12. The court recog-
nized a common interest, noting that if the deal was successful, the seller would be defending its
marketing of the patent before the sale and the buyer would be defending the marketing after the
sale. Id. at 310. The court stated:
This court also is concerned about the effect that finding waiver too freely might have on
the sort of business transaction i which defendant and GEC were involved. Holding that
this kind of disclosure constitutes a waiver could make it appreciably more difficult to
negotiate sales of businesses and products that arguably involve interests protected by
laws relating to intellectual property. Unless it serves some significant interest courts
should not create procedural doctrine that restricts communication between buyers and
sellers, erects barriers to business deals, and increases the risk that prospective buyers
will not have access to important information that could play key roles in assessing the
value of the business or product they are considering buying.
Id. at 311.
172. See Boardman, supra note 36, at 677 ("The open question is whether the lawyers remain
involved with the borrower's case after making the initial loan.").
173. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303-04 (D. Del. 2011) (find-
ing that the holder of the patent and the licensee have a common interest in the success of litigation
regarding the patents such that the privilege applied); Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales,
Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that an insurer and insured have a com-
mon interest such that the privilege applied).
174. 801 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D. Del. 2011).
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ization, and enforcement.175 In this context of a continuing, stable, con-
tractual relationship, the court recognized a sufficient common interest
shared by the patent holder and the entity such that the allied party-
common interest doctrine applied and the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected the shared materials from compelled disclosure.17 6 The court not-
ed: "Because [the entity's] compensation from Xerox is based on a con-
tingency fee, Xerox and [the entity] share a common interest in Xerox
prevailing in the instant litigation and the two companies have operated
with the expectation that any shared privileged communications would
be kept confidential and protected from disclosure."1 77
Interestingly, the court distinguished the facts before it from those
of Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., which involved an ALF
entity.78 With regard to the Leader case the court noted that "the docu-
ments as to which privilege was being asserted were created at a time
when the patentee and the potential investors were negotiating at arms-
length; at that time, no common interest existed."7 9 The Xerox court then
noted that "by contrast, the documents over which Xerox is asserting
privilege relate exclusively to a time frame in which [the entity to which
there was a disclosure] was already retained by, and working for and
with, Xerox."'80 Thus, the Xerox court might not find a common interest
in the investment decision stage, but perhaps would find a common in-
terest in the monitoring stage.
b. The Insurer-Insured Situation
Cases involving the application of the allied party-common interest
doctrine to the situation of insurers and insureds could be helpful because
the ALF entity in the relationship's monitoring stage is in a similar posi-
tion to an insurer providing coverage for liability and a defense to an
insured.'8 ' However, many courts recognize that in the typical insurer,
insured, attorney triangle of liability insurance, in which the insurer has
the contractual duty to provide the insured with a defense, selects defense
counsel, and exercises a degree of control over the defense raised, the
lawyer represents the insured and the insurer.'82 Because these courts
recognize insureds and insurers as joint clients, the courts also recognize
175. Id at 303-04.
176. Id. at 303.
177. Id. at 303-04.
178. Id. at 304; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
179. Xerox, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
180. Id.
181. See generally Boardman, supra note 36, at 673-75, 681-89 (discussing similarities and
differences); Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance. What 's the Difference?,
63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 617-31 (2014) (discussing similarities and differences).
182. See, e.g., Lamar Adver. of S.D., Inc. v. Kay, 267 F.R.D. 568, 581 (D.S.D. 2010)
("[W]here an insurer has agreed that it has a duty to defend and to indemnify its insured, both the
insured and insurer may be considered clients of the insured's lawyer."). While not all courts agree,
many courts so hold. See Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company
or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1603 (1994) (noting the disagreement).
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that the attorney-client privilege protects communications within the
triangle as communications among joint clients and their common coun-
sel.'83 Nonetheless, ALF entities are not joint clients with the litigation
parties,'84 and so much of the insurer-insured case law is not useful.
Occasionally, however, courts have evaluated the attorney-client
privilege's application in insurance settings in which the insured and
insurer are not quite so aligned as to be joint clients. In these cases the
insured has separate counsel because the insurer provides the defense
with a reservation of rights or the matter involves directors' and officers'
insurance in which the insurer funds the defense but does not choose the
attorney or exercise the same degree of control as insurers do in the gen-
eral liability setting. Many of these cases evaluate the privilege's ap-
plication not in disputes involving third parties, but rather, in disputes
between insurers and insureds.'8 6 The insurers claim that the insureds (or
other insurers) cannot assert the privilege with regard to communications
involving the insureds and the insured's attorneys because the insureds
and the insurers share a common interest. The common interest notion is
being used in these cases as a "sword" to obtain communications.'8 7 Be-
cause of the sword posture, these cases are less analogous to the ALF
setting in which the opposing party to the litigation, a stranger to the
communication, seeks disclosure of material shared with the ALF entity.
More analogous and thus more useful are cases in which the claim of
183. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526,
531 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) ("When an insurer retains counsel to defend its insured, a tripartite attor-
ney-client relationship arises among the insurer, insured, and counsel. As a consequence, confiden-
tial communications between either the insurer or the insured and counsel are protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege, and both the insurer and insured are holders of the privilege."). See generally
RICE, supra note 50, § 4:29 (discussing the application of the privilege to the insurance triangle
setting).
184. See discussion supra Part II.C.
185. See, e.g., In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 167 F.R.D. 447, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (evaluating
common interest in directors' and officers' insurance setting and reservation of rights); Waste
Mgmt., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 327-29 (Ill. 1991) (considering whether
there was a common interest shared between insured and insurer such that no privilege could later be
asserted against parties to that common interest where insurers indemnified defense costs but did not
select the attorney and did not direct the defense). See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Independent
Counsel in Insurance, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 888-903 (2011) (discussing independent counsel
and its relationship to the insurer); Lindsay Fisher, Comment, D&O Insurance: The Tension Be-
tween Cooperating with the Insurance Company and Protecting Privileged Information from Third
Party Plaintiffs, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 201, 203-10 (2008) (discussing directors' and officers'
liability insurance defense setting).
186. See, e.g., Allianz Ins. Co. v. Guidant Corp., 869 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (111. App. Ct. 2007)
(insurer sought access to communications between insured and attorney); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
Tonka Corp., 140 F.R.D. 381, 382 (D. Minn. 1992) (insurer sought communications between insured
and attorney on basis of common interest); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d
153, 159-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (insurer claimed it was not barred by the privilege from communi-
cations between insured and counsel because it shared a common interest with the insured).
187. Fisher, supra note 185, at 216; see also James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege
Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information
for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 637 (1997) (discussing "sword" characterization).
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common interest occurs in a "shield" posture to block disclosure to a
party outside the insurer, insured, attorney triangle.'88
A case that is particularly analogous is Lectrolarm Custom Systems,
Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc.' 89 In Lectrolarm, the court reviewed a claim of
common interest in a shield posture. A third party to the insurance rela-
tionship, Lectrolarm, sought access to communications involving the
insured and the insurer.190 Lectrolarm had brought suit against Pelco
making patent infringement and related claims.'9 1 Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Company provided a defense to Pelco under a reservation of rights
and so Pelco had independent counsel but shared some claim-related
information with Fireman's Fund.192 Lectrolarm sought access to what
Pelco shared on the theory that the sharing waived any attorney-client
privilege.19 3 The court determined that the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected the communications from disclosure by application of the allied
party-common interest doctrine, noting that though Pelco's independent
counsel did not represent Fireman's Fund, the insurer, Pelco and the in-
surer did share a common interest such that the privilege protected
shared communications from disclosure to third parties such as Lec-
trolarm.194
D. Applying the Allied Party-Common Interest Doctrine to ALF Entities
While the small number of courts that have addressed the attorney-
client privilege's application to disclosures to ALF entities in the midst
of investment decisions means there is little certainty as to how other
courts might view such sharing, the decisions certainly cast doubt on
whether the privilege protects materials shared with an ALF entity. The
court in Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., the only court to delve deeply
into the privilege application, distinguished Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
the case in which the court applied the privilege to materials shared with
a funder in the investment decision stage,'9 5 and determined that he al-
lied party-common interest doctrine did not immunize the sharing from
waiving the privilege.'9 6 Though with little analysis, the court in Leader
188. See Fischer, supra note 187, at 637 (discussing "shield" characterization).
189. 212 F.R.D. 567 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
190. Id. at 568-69.
191. Id. at 568.
192. Id. at 568-70.
193. Id. at 569.
194. Id. at 572 ("The Court finds that the common interest doctrine applies to protect at least
those communications between Pelco and Fireman's Fund relating to the claims and defenses in the
underlying lawsuit. As to these communications, there is a commonality of interest and the attorney
client privilege and the attorney work product privilege are not waived by the disclosure to Fire-
man's Fund.").
195. See Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 27, 2012); see also discussion supra Part III.B. The Miller court noted that the Devon ITopin-
ion was a one-sentence order with the privilege discussion in a footnote to that single sentence.
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 733 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
196. See Miller UK, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 734.
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Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. also denied the privilege's applica-
tion to materials shared with funders in the relationship's investment
decision stage.'97
The Miller and Leader courts reached the results consistent with the
existing privilege law and particularly the existing alliedparty-common
interest doctrine. Because the ALF entity in Devon IT ultimately chose to
invest, the court seemed to view the sharing more like a sharing in the
monitoring setting because by the time of the litigation the ALF entity
and the litigation client shared a common interest.'9 8 In determining
whether the privilege should apply, rather than focusing on the relation-
ship's end result as the court did in Devon IT, a more appropriate analy-
sis should focus on the stage of the relationship in which the parties share
communications.'99
The variety of results and reasoning used by the courts in settings
similar to the ALF investment decision setting make clear that this is not
an area of the law in which there are definitive conclusions. While some
courts may recognize a common interest and thus find disclosures pro-
tected by the privilege, a significant portion of courts would be unwilling
to recognize that the client and the ALF entity share a common interest
in the investment decision stage's arm's length setting.
In contrast, courts are much more likely to find sharing in the moni-
toring stage to be privileged and thus not subject to compelled disclosure.
If a court views the monitoring stage to be one in which the ALF entity
and the client are in a stable, confidential relationship of shared objec-
tives, then that court might very well follow the Xerox court's path in the
analogous setting of patent licensing.200 The Xerox court applied the priv-
ilege to communications involving a patent holder and the entity entrust-
ed contractually with the patents' commercialization and enforcement.20'
The Xerox court expressly found the situation when the communications
occurred not to be an arm's length situation but rather one in which the
parties were working together with common interest.202
The ALF entity's situation in the monitoring stage is similar to the
position of an insurer who is financially responsible for an insured's de-
fense but who is not controlling the defense and not selecting the in-
197. See Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (D. Del. 2010); see
also discussion supra Part III.B.
198. Devon IT, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1; see discussion supra Part III.B.
199. See RICE, supra note 50, § 4:38 (espousing the position that the application of the allied
party-common interest doctrine depends on the reason the communications are shared).
200. See Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303-04 (D. Del. 2011); see also
discussion supra Part Ii.C.2.a.
201. 801 F. Supp. at 303.
202. Id. at 304.
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sured's counsel.203 The ALF entity has an interest in the litigation's result
but generally does not exercise control.2 04 If a court follows the path of
the Lectrolarm case, a case involving such limited involvement by the
insurer, that court may find a common interest though the ALF entity is
not intimately involved in the matter's defense but is involved monetari-
ly. Such a court may be willing to recognize a common interest among
the ALF entity, the client, and the attorney. The cooperative relationship,
along with the financial interest in the litigation result, may be a suffi-
cient commonality. Such a court would then be willing to apply the privi-
lege to communications involving ALF entities in the monitoring stage.
Whether a court is willing to apply the privilege will depend on the
strictness with which that court views the requirement of joint involve-
ment. For example, a court that views a common interest as only present
when two parties are both at risk of an adverse judgment in a litigation
205
matter will not find a common interest in a matter involving an ALF.
A court willing to recognize a common interest even though the ALF
entity's interest in the litigation's result is limited to the effect result has
on the ALF's ability to recover its investment will find a common inter-
est in the typical ALF situation. Thus, such a court will conclude that the
attorney-client privilege protects communications involving an ALF enti-
ty.
V. AGENCY DOCTRINE
In addition to the joint client and allied party-common interest doc-
trine exceptions to the rule that attorney and client communications in-
volving third parties are not privileged,20 6 courts have recognized that the
privilege does apply even in the presence of third parties in certain cir-
cumstances by application of agency principles. First, when the client is
a corporation or other organization, communications involving nonem-
203. The similarity of the ALF entity in the monitoring stage and an insurer paying for a de-
fense is emphasized by contrasting the situation of a public relations firm assisting with litigation. In
Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), the court evaluated a claim of privilege
for communications shared with a public relations firm assisting with litigation. Id. at 425-26. The
litigating party claimed that the public relations firm shared a common interest with the litigating
party and his counsel such that communications within the group were privileged as the result of the
allied party-common interest doctrine. Id at 433. The court disagreed, noting that "the doctrine does
not contemplate that an agent's desire for its principal to win a lawsuit is an interest sufficient to
prevent waiver of privilege inasmuch as it does not reflect a common defense or legal strategy." Id.
at 434.
204. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman & Alana Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Compara-
tive Analysis ofAustralian, Canadian and US. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L.
93, 137 (2013) (noting ALF entity disclaimers of interest in control); see also Boardman, supra note
36, at 695 (stating that litigation funding will be less intrusive than insurer involvement in defense
actions).
205. See, e.g., Egiazaryan, 290 F.R.D. at 434-35 (noting that the public relations firm was not
a party to the lawsuit and "has no need to develop a common litigation strategy").
206. See In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[I]f persons
other than the client, its attorney, or their agents are present, the communication is not made in
confidence, and the privilege does not attach.").
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ployee third parties can enjoy the privilege if those nonemployee third
parties are functional equivalents of corporate employees.207 Theoretical-
ly, no third party is present because the functional equivalent party is the
agent through whom the corporation acts. Might an ALF entity be a
functional equivalent of a corporate litigating party such that the ALF
entity's involvement does not waive the privilege's protection?
Second, courts recognize that third parties who are agents of the
lawyer or the client can be involved in communications without a loss of
privilege if the third party is sufficiently necessary to the communica-
tion.208 Might an ALF entity be sufficiently necessary such that the ALF
entity can be involved in communications and yet the privilege apply? Or
might an ALF entity be sufficiently necessary so that disclosure to the
ALF entity of otherwise privileged communications does not waive the
privilege?
If an ALF entity fits either of these agent categories, then including
the ALF entity in attorney-client communications does not prevent the
privilege from attaching and disclosing otherwise privileged material to
the ALF entity does not waive the privilege. While courts have exhibited
209quite a bit of confusion in applying these agency concepts, it is not
likely that even in the midst of the confusion a court would find commu-
nications involving an ALF entity to be privileged.
A. Might an ALF Entity Be a Functional Equivalent of the Client?
1. Upjohn v. United States
The United States Supreme Court clarified in Upjohn v. United
States2 10 that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications with
corporations as it applies to communications with individual clients.2 1
Since a corporation can only act by way of agents, one of the issues be-
fore the Upjohn Court was the test for determining which communica-
tions between corporate employees and the attorney representing the
corporation were privileged.
207. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 937-38 (8th Cir. 1994); Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 3016 (AGS)(HBP), 2002 WL 31556383, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002). The Restatement recognizes that a third party who is not an employee can
be a corporation's representative for purposes of the privilege. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 (2000).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961).
209. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate
Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727, 731 (2009) (discussing the courts'
confusion).
210. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
211. See id. at 391. This principle was not new with the Upjohn decision. See United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). See generally Grace M. Giesel, The Legal
Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and
Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169, 1183-86 (1997) (discuss-
ing the Upjohn decision).
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In Upjohn the corporation's attorney conducted an internal investi-
gation to determine whether any illegal payments on the corporation's
behalf had been made to foreign governments.2 12 The Internal Revenue
Service later demanded that investigation materials be produced.213 The
corporation claimed privilege.2 14 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit determined that the privilege could apply only to com-
munications between the corporation's control group and the lawyer.2 15
The control group's members were people who could control the corpo-
rate response to the lawyer's advice or who could be significantly in-
216
volved in designing that response. Another test used by the courts be-
fore the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision was a test that came to be
known as the subject matter test.217 With this test, an employee, no mat-
ter how lowly, speaks for the corporation and thus the communication
enjoyed the privilege's protection if "the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the com-
munication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his em-
ployment" and "the employee makes the communication at the direction
of his superiors in the corporation."2 18 The Supreme Court in Upjohn
rejected the control group test but did not explicitly adopt the subject
matter test.219 The Court found the communications privileged, noting
that they were necessary for counsel to advise the corporation, that the
communications occurred because superiors directed that they occur, that
everyone knew they were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, that
the communications related to the employees' duties at the corporation,
and the communications were otherwise within the privilege's protection
because they were treated as confidential.2 20
While Upjohn dealt with federal common law,221 many states now
use some variation of the subject matter test.222 Generally, courts apply
the privilege to communications between the lawyer and the corpora-
212. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387.
213. Id. at 387-88.
214. Id. at 388.
215. Id. at 388-89.
216. See Glen Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 908 (1980); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424,424, 429-30 (1970).
217. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:2 1; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
87, § 5483 (discussing subject matter test).
218. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (per curiam).
219. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-95 ("[I]t will frequently be employees beyond the control
group ... who will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers").
220. Id at 394-95.
221. See id. at 389.
222. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res., 859 So. 2d 1096, 1104-
06 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that privilege attaches to the control group and employees
whose jobs relate to the matter about which the communications relate); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994) (adopting the subject matter standard).
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tion's "natural spokesperson"-the party who has the information needed
by the lawyer to advise the client corporation.223
2. The Extension to Third Parties Who Are Not the Corporation's
Employees
Following the Upjohn opinion's logic, some courts have held that
the privilege applies when the corporation's agent communicating with
counsel is not the corporation's employee.2 24 These courts recognize that
the attorney-client privilege can apply even if the attorney is dealing with
a third party who is not an employee if the third party is the functional
equivalent of a corporate employee. The rationale is that a corpora-
tion's agent may have information an attorney needs to render advice to
the corporation regardless of official employment status or artificial con-
cepts of enterprise bounds.226 Likewise, such an agent, at least theoreti-
cally, may be situated to act upon the attorney's advice on the corpora-
tion's behalf.
An often referenced case with regard to determining when a
nonemployee third party is a functional equivalent for privilege purposes
is In re Bieter Co., 2 27 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. The Bieter Company was formed to develop a parcel
228
of land. A nonemployee third party was intimately involved in the
project and the ensuing litigation, providing guidance and advice.22 9 The
third party rendered his services pursuant a contract-at least initially. 23 0
In the midst of litigation regarding the land project, the opposing party
sought access to communications that had included the third party or that
later had been disclosed to the third party.231 The court found that the
223. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:21 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(coining term "natural spokesperson").
224. See generally RICE, supra note 50, § 4:19 (discussing case law interpreting the scope of
the privilege concerning corporations, employees, and agents).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the third
party was a functional equivalent, the court stated: "[w]e find the reasoning in Bieter persuasive and
adopt its principles in the Ninth Circuit."); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938-40 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding the third party a functional equivalent); Digital Vending Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Phx.,
Inc., No. 2:09cv555, 2013 WL 1560212, at *9-10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013) (finding that the privi-
lege applied because party was the functional equivalent of a member of the Board of Directors); In
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. I 1-CV-2509-LHK-PSG, 2013 WL 772668, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 28, 2013) (finding that the privilege applied because third party advisor was the functional
equivalent of an employee).
226. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 498 (1982) ("There is no reason to differentiate between an account-
ant-employee and a regularly retained outside accountant when both occupy the same extremely
sensitive and continuing position as financial adviser, reviewer, and agent: both possess information
of equal importance to the lawyer."); see also Beardslee, supra note 209, at 748 (discussing the
functional equivalent doctrine).
227. 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994).
228. Id at 930.
229. Id. at 933-34.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 931.
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privilege protected the communications including or disclosed to the
third party, stating:
There is no principled basis to distinguish [the third party's] role
from that of an employee, and his involvement in the subject of the
litigation makes him precisely the sort of person with whom a lawyer
would wish to confer confidentially in order to understand Bieter's
reasons for seeking representation. . . . [H]e was in all relevant re-
spects the functional equivalent of an employee.232
In Bieter, the functional equivalent third party's involvement was
extensive and continuing, and the tasks he performed were indeed typical
233 234
of an employee.233 Similarly, in In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, the
nonemployee third party was an independent consultant for a pharmaceu-
tical company who was "an integrated member of the brand maturation
team."23 5 The Flonase court accepted that the third party was a functional
equivalent but noted that it could not determine whether particular com-
munications were privileged without looking at each document and con-
firming that the communication was for the purpose of providing or ob-
236taining legal advice.
Courts have found third parties to be functional equivalents in less
standard settings as well. For example, in In re High-Tech Employee
Antitrust Litigation,237 the court found an "executive whisperer" who
advised Google's top management to be a functional equivalent, stating
that "[h]is high-level position and advisory role suggests that a blanket
denial of the attorney-client privilege would undermine . . . the ability of
the corporation both to provide information to its counsel and to obtain
guidance from its counsel."238 In Digital Vending Services International,
232. Id. at 938 (citations omitted). The Bieter court referred to McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132
F.R.D. 234 (N.D. Cal. 1990) for guidance as well as Sexton, supra note 226. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938.
233. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938. In explaining the nature of the third party's involvement, the Bieter
court stated:
[The third party] has been involved on a daily basis with the principals of Bieter and on
Bieter's behalf in the unsuccessful development that serves as the basis for this litigation.
Bieter was formed with a single objective and [the third party] has been intimately in-
volved in the attempt to achieve that objective. As Bieter's sole representative at meet-
ings with potential tenants and with local officials, he likely possesses information that is
possessed by no other. As the initial retainer agreement he entered into with Bieter indi-
cates, it retained him "to provide advice and guidance regarding commercial and retail
development based upon [his] knowledge of commercial and retail business in the State
of Minnesota," just as one would retain an outside accountant for her knowledge of, say,
the proper accounting practices and taxation concerns of partnerships.
Id. But see Freeport-McMoran Sulphur, LLC v. Mike Mullen Energy Equip. Res., Inc., Nos. Civ.A.
03-1496, Civ.A. 03-1664, 2004 WL 1237450, at *5-6 (E.D. La. June 2, 2004) (finding no privilege
where the third party did not hold himself out as the entity's representative though he had worked for
the client for twenty-five years).
234. 879 F. Supp. 2d 454 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
235. Id. at 454, 460.
236. Id. at 460.
237. No. I l-CV-2509-LHK-PSG, 2013 WL 772668 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013).
238. Id. at * 1, *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Inc. v. University of Phoenix, Inc.,239 the court applied the functional
equivalent concept not to find a functional equivalent of an employee,
but rather to find a third party to be a functional equivalent of a member
of the Board of Directors.240 The court justified its decision by noting
that the third party had a "need to know counsel's advice as he was part
of the strategic decision making for [the entity]."24'
In some cases the relationship between the nonemployee third party
and the entity is even more abbreviated.24 2 For example, in A.H. ex rel.
Hadjih v. Evenflo Co.,243 the court found the third party, a public rela-
tions firm brought in to assist Evenflo in the recall of a product, was a
functional equivalent of an employee for purposes of the privilege's ap-
plication.244 The court noted that the communications were "primarily or
predominately of a legal character and therefore would be considered
privileged attorney-client communications if the [third party individuals]
were technically employees of Evenflo."245 Likewise, in In re Copper
Market Antitrust Litigation, the court held that the privilege protected
communications to and from a "crisis management" public relations firm
engaged to help a corporation handle a copper trading scandal.247 In so
holding the court stated: "[i]n applying the principles set forth by the
Supreme Court in Upjohn, there is no reason to distinguish between a
person on the corporation's payroll and a consultant hired by the corpo-
ration if each acts for the corporation and possesses the information
needed by attorneys in rendering legal advice."24 8 The Copper Market
court continued: "for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, [the public
relations firm] can fairly be equated with the [corporation] for purposes
of analyzing the availability of the attorney-client privilege to protect
communications to which [the public relations firm] was a party concern-
ing its scandal-related duties."249
The case law is rather short on clear statements of the test the courts
apply to determine whether a third party is a functional equivalent to a
corporation's employee, but some courts such as Export-Import Bank of
the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co.,250 note several factors: (1)
whether the third party had a "key corporate job"; (2) "whether there was
239. No. 2:09cv555, 2013 WL 1560212 (E.D. Va. April 12, 2013).
240. Id. at *10.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 3016
(AGS)(HGB), 2002 WL 31556383, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002) (involving disclosure to
independent contractors engaged to create movie).
243. No. 10-CV-02435-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 1957302 (D. Colo. May 31, 2012).
244. Id. at *4-5.
245. Id. at *5.
246. 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
247. Id. at 215-16, 220 (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. Id. at 219.
249. Id
250. 232 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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a continuous and close working relationship between the consultant and
the company's principals on matters critical to the company's position in
litigation"; and (3) "whether the consultant is likely to possess infor-
mation possessed by no one else at the company."2 51
Courts have accepted the functional equivalent agent concept with
regard to communications with third parties because it is consistent with
Upjohn's rationale. Communications between attorneys for the entity and
certain nonemployee third parties must be privileged so that lawyers can
access information necessary to provide the best possible representation
to the client corporation.
In contrast, there is usually no reason consistent with the privilege
for otherwise privileged communications that did not include a third par-
ty to be shared with that third party and retain the privilege's protection.
In LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,25 2 the court refused to
find such communications with a third party marketing entity privileged
because there was no need consistent with the privilege's rationale; the
corporation could receive the attorney-client privileged communication
and screen it.253
3. Application of the Functional Equivalent Agent Doctrine to ALF
Entities
As an initial matter, this functional equivalent agent doctrine is a
creature of the narrow area of law dealing with applying the privilege to
corporations; in any matter in which the client is not a corporation or
similar entity, it has no application.254 In situations involving corpora-
tions, the question is whether the third party, the ALF entity, acts as the
agent of the corporate entity in the communications with counsel. A rare
court might find an ALF entity to be the functional equivalent of a corpo-
rate employee, but the vast majority of courts will not so find.
251. Id. at 113; see also A.H. ex rel. Hadjih v. Evenflo Co., No. 10-CV-02435-RBJ-KMT,
2012 WL 1957302, at *3 (D. Colo. May 31, 2012) (quoting three-factor test); LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc.
v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963-65 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quoting three-factor test but
stopping short of accepting functional equivalent concept).
252. 661 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
253. Id. at 964-65; see also RICE, supra note 50, § 4:19 (discussing the Special Master's Opin-
ion in In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007), which states that he
privilege should not apply to communications to the third parties unless the third parties can act on
the corporation's behalf without screening and approval). But see Digital Vending Servs. Int'l, Inc.
v. Univ. of Phx., Inc., No. 2:09cv555, 2013 WL 1560212, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013) (applying
the privilege to communications which flowed to the third party because the functional equivalent
"had a need to know counsel's advice as he was part of the strategic decision making for [the enti-
ty]"). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, The Application of the Attorney-
Client Privilege to Interactions Among Clients, Attorneys, and Experts in the Age of Consultants:
The Need for a More Precise, Fundamental Analysis, 48 HOuS. L. REv. 265, 292-93, 310-13 (2011)
(discussing the scope of the privilege when consulting third-party experts).
254. In Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), the court distinguished the
functional equivalent analysis used in In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation, 200 F.R.D. 213
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), noting that the case before the court did not involve a corporation. Egiazaryan, 290
F.R.D. at 433 ("Here, there is no corporation involved .... .").
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An ALF entity at the investment decision stage or at the monitoring
stage is not serving the same role as an employee might; it is not a third
party performing a task that an employee might if the corporation had not
chosen to outsource the task. The ALF entity is thus not like the employ-
ee in Bieter, whose involvement in the real estate venture that was the
litigation's subject matter was extensive and continuing.255
The ALF entity also is not the source of information necessary to
the attorney in advising the corporate client. In Bieter the third party was
the natural person who knew the details of the venture that was the sub-
ject of the litigation just as an employee who managed the venture would
have been knowledgeable of the venture's details.256 An ALF entity is
not such a source of information. Rather, the ALF entity is simply the
receiver of information from the client or attorney; the ALF entity is not
involved in the underlying litigation's subject matter at all.
Some courts, such as the Evenflo and Copper Market courts, have
been willing to find that a third party is a functional equivalent even
when the third party is engaged on a less continuing basis and even when
the third party is engaged to advise the corporation at a time when litiga-
tion looms. 25 7 An ALF entity's time of involvement is when litigation is
anticipated and when it is occurring. In this way, an ALF entity's posi-
tion is similar to the public relations firms in the Evenflo and Copper
Market cases.
Yet, an ALF entity does not advise or assist the client or the attor-
ney at the investment decision stage. If one accepts that an ALF entity
does advise and assist to some degree in the monitoring stage, then it is
possible that a court could find an ALF entity to be a functional equiva-
lent such that communications involving the ALF entity would be privi-
leged just as the In re High-Tech court found communications with the
"executive whisperer" to be privileged.258 However, even the reasoning
of the High-Tech decision would not support finding communications
with an ALF entity to be privileged because that court focused on the
fact that denying the privilege to the "executive whisperer" would "un-
dermine . . . the ability of the corporation both to provide information to
its counsel and to obtain guidance from its counsel."259 In contrast, an
255. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994); see also discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
256. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938 ("[H]is involvement in the subject of the litigation makes him
precisely the sort of person with whom a lawyer would wish to confer confidentially in order to
understand Bieter's reasons for seeking representation.").
257. See A.H. ex rel. Hadjih v. Evenflo Co., No. 10-CV-02435-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 1957302,
at *11-12, *14 (D. Colo. May 31, 2012) (involving a public relations firm engaged to assist with the
issues surrounding the recall of a product); Copper Market, 200 F.R.D. at 215-16, 219 (involving a
"crisis management" public relations firm engaged to assist with issues surrounding a scandal (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
258. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. I 1-CV-2509-LHK-PSG, 2013 WL 772668, at
*1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ALF entity does not assist the corporation in providing information to
counsel and certainly does not assist the corporation in obtaining guid-
ance from counsel.
If a court applies the three factors noted in Export-Import Bank260 to
an ALF entity's situation, such a court must conclude that communica-
tions involving the ALF entity are not privileged because the ALF entity
is not the functional equivalent of a corporate employee. The ALF entity
does not have a "key corporate job" in either the investment decision or
monitoring stage.26 1 In addition, it would be difficult to conclude that the
ALF entity had a "continuous and close working relationship" with "the
company's principals on matters critical to the company's position in
litigation." 2 62 Finally, the ALF definitely does not "possess information
possessed by no one else at the company."263 The nature of the ALF enti-
ty's involvement is simply not that of a functional equivalent to an em-
ployee of the corporate litigation party.
B. Might Communications Involving ALF Entities Be Privileged Under
the Kovel Agency Doctrine?
1. The Kovel Agency Doctrine
Aside from a nonemployee third party who is the functional equiva-
lent of an entity employee and therefore may speak for the entity for
privilege's purposes, some communications involving third parties to the
attorney-client relationship retain their privileged status if the third party
is a particular kind of agent of the client or the attorney.264 Courts have
long applied the privilege to communications involving agents of either
the client or the lawyer if those agents facilitate what would be an other-
wise privileged communication between attorney and client. So the in-
volvement of office personnel such as "administrative assistants, recep-
tionists, and messengers" does not affect the application of the privi-
265lege. Courts have held that the involvement of agents such as law
260. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). The factors are as follows: (1) whether the third party had a "key corporate job"; (2) "whether
there was a continuous and close working relationship between the consultant and the company's
principals on matters critical to the company's position in litigation"; and (3) "whether the consultant




264. Beardslee, supra note 209, at 731 (discussing this agency notion).
265. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:15, at 516-17; see also Edward J. lmwin-
kelried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing
the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68 WASH.
U. L.Q. 19, 25-26 (1990) ("All courts and commentators agree that clerks and secretaries fall within
the definition. They are convenient intermediaries for communication between the attorney and
client, and society would gain nothing by forcing attorneys to communicate face-to-face with clients
and forego the use of such intermediaries." (footnotes omitted)).
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clerks, investigators, and paralegals also does not destroy the privilege.2 66
Courts and commentators accept that interpreters do not destroy the priv-
ilege because they act as a conduit of the communication to or from the
client.267
The seminal case involving an agent who was not a receptionist or
other basic conduit of attorney-client communication is United States v.
Kovel,268 a case involving an accountant employed by a law firm and his
communications with the client of one of the law firm's attorneys.269
Using an analogy to a language translator who transforms the client's
statements into a language the client's counsel can comprehend, the
Kovel opinion states that the same is true for an accountant who makes
the client's story comprehensible to the client's counsel.270 In finding that
the communications involving the accountant enjoyed the privilege, the
court stated:
[T]he presence of an accountant, whether hired by the lawyer
or by the client, while the client is relating a complicated tax
story to the lawyer, ought not destroy the privilege, any more
than would that of the linguist . . ; the presence of the ac-
countant is necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effec-
tive consultation between the client and the lawyer which the
privilege is designed to permit. By the same token, if the law-
yer has directed the client, either in the specific case or gener-
ally, to tell his story in the first instance to an accountant en-
gaged by the lawyer, who is then to interpret it so that the
lawyer may better give legal advice, communications by the
client reasonably related to that purpose ought fall within the
privilege .... What is vital to the privilege is that the commu-
nication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice from the lawyer. If what is sought is not legal ad-
vice but only accounting service, . . . or if the advice sought is
the accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no privilege ex-
ists.271
266. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:15; RICE, supra note 50, § 3:3; see, e.g.,
Owens v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (holding that a
paralegal is covered by the privilege); Am. Nat'l Watermattress Corp. v. Manville, 642 P.2d 1330,
1334 (Alaska 1982) (holding that an investigator is covered by the privilege).
267. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 87, § 5486; Imwinkelried, supra note 265, at 26; see
also People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (N.Y. 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. f, illus. 2 (2000).
268. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). In recognizing the settled law regarding communication
agents, the court noted, "[i]ndeed, the Government does not here dispute that the privilege covers
communications to non-lawyer employees with 'a menial or ministerial responsibility that involves
relating communications to an attorney."' Id. at 921.
269. Id. at 919.
270. Id. at 921-22.
271. Id. at 922 (footnote omitted).
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2. Courts' Application of the Kovel Agency Doctrine
272While there are exceptions, courts generally have applied the
Kovel principle narrowly, not expansively.2 73  For example, in
Egiazaryan, the court refused to apply the privilege to communications
involving a public relations firm the plaintiff had engaged to assist re-
garding his claims of defamation and injurious falsehood.274 The court
stated that to benefit from the privilege one must show "(1) . . . a reason-
able expectation of confidentiality under the circumstances, and (2) [that]
disclosure to the third party was necessary for the client to obtain in-
formed legal advice."275 The court explained that "[tihe 'necessity' ele-
ment means more than just useful and convenient, but rather requires that
the involvement of the third party be nearly indispensable or serve some
specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-client communica-
11276tions. The court continued: "Thus, where the third party's presence is
merely useful but not necessary, the privilege is lost."2 77 While the plain-
tiff claimed that the public relations firm was retained to "[d]evelop a set
of key messages and compelling narrative in support of the legal cases"
and "participate[ ] in the development of legal strategy"278 and advised
the plaintiff about the benefits of legal action, the court denied the privi-
lege because the plaintiff did not show the firm's involvement "was nec-
essary to facilitate communications between himself and his counsel."279
Thus, the Egiazaryan court applied a high standard of necessity and a
narrow notion of facilitation by limiting the acceptable facilitation to
facilitation of communications between attorney and client, not facilita-
tion of legal representation in general.
Similarly, in Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. 275 Washington Street
28028Corp., a court refused to find communications privileged281 that in-
volved a real estate agent hired by a trust client to find a tenant for a va-
272. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(applying the privilege to communications involving public relations firm because it assisted the
attorney in influencing the prosecution and regulators regarding the indictment decision);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 476-77 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (applying the
privilege to a consultant).
273. See, e.g., Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. 275 Wash. St. Corp., No. 09-l1343-NMG, 2012 WL
1247756, at *7 (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 2012); United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir.
1999).
274. Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 431-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
275. Id. at 431 (alterations in original) (quoting Don v. Singer, No. 105584/06, 2008 WL
2229743, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Id. (quoting Nat'l Educ. Training Grp., Inc. v. Skillsoft Corp., No. M8-85(WHP), 1999
WL 378337, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277. Id. (quoting Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 240 F.R.D. 96, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. Id (alterations in original) (quoting exhibits from the record) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
279. Id.
280. No. 09-I 1343-NMG, 2012 WL 1247756 (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 2012).
281. Id. at *7.
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cant space.282 The court stated that the third party must be "necessary for
the effective consultation between client and attorney"283  and
"[s]ignificantly, this "'necessity" element means more than just useful
and convenient. The involvement of the third party must be nearly indis-
pensable or serve some specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-
client communications. Mere convenience is not sufficient."'2 4 The
court continued, saying that "the exception applies only to communica-
tions in which the third party plays an interpretive role. In other words,
the third party's communication must serve to translate information be-
tween the client and the attorney."285 The court also pointed out that the
advice provided by the third party was business advice, not legal ad-
vice.286
A narrow application of the Kovel principle is typical. Courts com-
monly have found privilege only when the third party plays an interpre-
tive role. In United States v. Ackert,288 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, the same court that authored the Kovel opin-
ion, refused to find communications involving an investment banker to
be privileged because the attorney dealing with the investment banker
did not rely on the investment banker "to translate or interpret infor-
mation given to [the attorney]."289 And in In re Refco Securities Litiga-
290
tion, the court refused to apply the privilege to communications in-
282. Id at *1.
283. Id at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting Comm'r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901
N.E.2d I 85, 1197 (Mass. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Id. (quoting Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002)).
285. Id at *8 (quoting Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 714 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D. Mass.
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Id.; see also Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2011)
(refusing to find communications involving a factchecker privileged where the factchecker was hired
because such a consultation was necessary to assist the attorney in obtaining insurance for the cli-
ent's documentary film project).
287. In Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., No. 07 Civ. 5898(RJS)(JCF), 2010 WL 3835149
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2010), the court refused to apply the privilege to communications involving
third party experts engaged to render opinions about the qualities of a dietary supplement because
the experts "were not acting as 'interpreters' of scientific concepts for [the attorney]." Id. at *1-3.
The Merck court stated: "when an attorney seeks out a third party to provide information rather than
to act as a translator for client communications, the communications between the attorney and the
third party are not privileged." Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d
Cir. 1999)); see also Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, No. 10-CV-00569, 2012 WL 3527935, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2012) (denying privilege because consultant's contact with documents was not to "improve
the comprehension of the communications between [the attorney] and [the client]" (quoting Ackert,
169 F.3d at 139)) (internal quotation marks omitted); AVX Corp. v. Horry Land Co., No. 4:07-CV-
3299-TLW-TER, 2010 WL 4884903, at *9-10 (D.S.C. Nov. 24, 2010) (denying privilege to com-
munications involving an environmental consultant because the consultants "were not simply putting
into usable form information obtained from the client; rather, they were independently gathering
their own data, conducting testing, engaging in remedial measures and rendering opinions" and thus
there was no showing "that the communication involved gathering information from client confi-
dences or providing information from the client through the consultant to the attorney for the pur-
pose of assisting the attorney in giving legal advice").
288. 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
289. Id. at 139.
290. 280 F.R.D. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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volving a third party consultant, stating that "there is no evidence sug-
gesting [the attorney] relied on [the consultant] to translate or interpret
information given to him by his clients."291
Even in a case in which the court applied the privilege to communi-
cations involving a public relations firm, the court required a significant
showing regarding the third party's importance and role.292 In In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas,2 93 the defense of a target in a high-profile inves-
tigation engaged a public relations firm to assist with a media message to
convince the prosecution and regulators not to indict the target.294 After
noting that "the ability of lawyers to perform some of their most funda-
mental client functions . . . would be undermined seriously if lawyers
were not able to engage in frank discussions of facts and strategies with
the lawyers' public relations consultants,"295 the court found that com-
munications involving the public relations firm were privileged, stating:
In consequence, this Court holds that (1) confidential communica-
tions (2) between lawyers and public relations consultants (3) hired
by the lawyers to assist them in dealing with the media in cases such
as this (4) that are made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice
(5) directed at handling the client's legal problems are protected by
the attorney-client privilege.296
Interestingly, the court, with regard to particular communications, was
concerned with whether the communication "has a nexus sufficiently
close to the provision or receipt of legal advice."2 97 Evidently, the court
determined that some communications involving the public relations firm
did have this nexus generally since it determined that the privilege ap-
plied,298 though the court denied the privilege on the basis of a lack of
"nexus" to other communications between the client and the public rela-
tions firm. 299
Rather than applying the Kovel agency doctrine as developed in
other cases, this court seemed to recognize an independent privilege for
291. Id. at 105 ("What does not appear, however, is any evidence that here was information
[the attorney] could not understand without [the consultant] translating or interpreting the raw data
for him.").
292. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
293. 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
294. Id at 323. The high profile client was Martha Stewart. Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and
the High-Profile Client-Should the Attorney-Client Privilege Extend to Communications with
Public Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545, 562 (2005).
295. Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
296. Id. at 331.
297. Id. at 332. The court also noted that communications involving jury consultants "and
personal communication consultants come within the attorney-client privilege, as they have a close
nexus to the attorney's role in advocating the client's cause before a court or other decision-making
body." Id. at 326.
298. Id. at 331.
299. Id. at 332 ("[T]here has been no showing that it has a nexus sufficiently close to the provi-
sion or receipt of legal advice.").
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public relations firms in some situations. Many courts, when dealing with
the question of privilege when public relations firms have been involved,
have not gone so far, and like the Egiazaryan court, have denied the priv-
ilege.3 00
3. Applying the Kovel Agency Doctrine to ALF Entities
Communications involving ALF entities that occur in the invest-
ment decision stage or in the monitoring stage are not conduit communi-
cations in which the ALF entity is in a role akin to a secretary, law clerk,
or investigator. Nor is an ALF entity in the same interpretive role as the
accountant in the Kovel case.30' An ALF entity's role is not to assist
communication between attorney and client so any communication in-
volving an ALF entity cannot be "necessary to facilitate communications
between [client] and his counsel."302 Nor is an ALF entity "nearly indis-
pensable or serve[ing] some specialized purpose in facilitating the attor-
ney-client communications.'"303 An ALF entity does not interpret or
translate in any way. Any analogy to a translator or interpreter fails as
does a looser analogy to a third party such as the accountant in Kovel.
Any court that requires the third party to be in "an interpretive role"04
would reject any claim of privilege summarily.305
The only port in the storm for an ALF entity is the argument that
communications involving it are necessary for the rendering of legal ad-
vice because without funding there can be no legal advice. As is obvious
from this Article's discussion of a sampling of court opinions, many
courts would not apply the privilege because they do not have such an
expansive view of the Kovel doctrine. A court such as the Grand Jury
Subpoenas court might be receptive to this claim of privilege, but even
that result is highly speculative. From its application of the privilege to a
public relations firm based on the firm's services that were essential to
rendering legal advice, it is clear that the Grand Jury Subpoenas court
was not constrained by the interpreter analogy. Rather, a kindred court
may be willing to extend the privilege's protection when the court be-
lieves "the ability of lawyers to perform some of their most fundamental
client functions . . . would be undermined seriously if lawyers were not
able to engage in frank discussions of facts and strategies with"306 ALF
entities. Yet, that court did require "a nexus sufficiently close to the pro-
300. See Murphy, supra note 294, at 570; see also Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner,
198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.D.C. 1999);
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 616, 619 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
301. See discussion supra Part IV.B. I.
302. Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasis in original).
303. Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. 275 Wash. St. Corp., No. 09-11343-NMG, 2012 WL 1247756, at
*7 (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 2012) (quoting Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002)).
304. Id. at *8 (quoting Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 714 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D. Mass.
2010)).
305. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
306. Id. at 330.
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vision or receipt of legal advice."307 Even though funding of a representa-
tion is related to the provision of legal advice, perhaps even the Grand
Jury Subpoenas court would not find that "nexus" to be "sufficiently
close."308
Thus, courts' past treatment of claims of privilege under the Kovel
doctrine signals that a claim that communications involving an ALF enti-
ty should benefit from the privilege will not be accepted by all but the
rare court.
VI. SHOULD COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVING ALF ENTITIES BE
PRIVILEGED?
This Article has concluded that ALF entities cannot avail them-
selves of the joint client doctrine. It has also concluded that ALF entities
cannot successfully claim privilege via the common interest doctrine for
communications in the investment decision stage, and that such a claim
for communications in the monitoring stage is questionable at best. In
addition, this Article has concluded that courts applying the attorney-
client privilege, in accord with its bounds as current law defines those
bounds, would not likely find communications with ALF entities to be
privileged under the functional equivalent agent doctrine or the Kovel
agency doctrine. The next logical question is whether the current attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine should be stretched beyond its current
boundaries to reach the ALF scenario.
There may be very good policy arguments for creating a special
privilege for ALF entities.309 This Article expresses no opinion about the
wisdom or folly of such arguments.
Yet, the existing attorney-client privilege doctrine and all of its sub-
doctrines (joint client doctrine, allied party-common interest doctrine,
functional equivalent agent doctrine, and Kovel agency doctrine) should
not be modified to encompass communications with ALF entities.
307. Id at 332.
308. Id.; see also Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confi-
dentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 399 (2005). Richmond states
that for communications with a public relations firm to be privileged "there must be a clear nexus
between the public relations consultant's work and the attorney's role in representing the client. In
other words, the client must show that communications with a public relations consultant were made
so that the client could obtain legal advice from his attorney." Id. (footnote omitted).
309. See Molot, supra note 5, at 186 (arguing that communications involving ALF entities
should be privileged because ALF "level[s] the playing field" in litigation). See generally DeStefa-
no, supra note 20, at 2797 (arguing that barriers to the involvement of third parties in the provision
of legal services should be mitigated because the involvement of some third parties, such as ALF
entities, is beneficial). Others have posited that there should not be barriers to third parties of other
sorts. See, e.g., Spencer Rand, Hearing Stories Already Told: Successfully Incorporating Third Party
Professionals into the Attorney-Client Relationship, 80 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (2012) (discussing
inclusion, for example, of therapists in domestic violence matters and social workers in elder law
and other matters).
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No reason consistent with the attorney-client privilege's modem
raison d'etre exists for extending the privilege to communications in-
volving ALF entities. In Upjohn the Supreme Court provided a statement
of the attorney-client privilege's modern purpose:
[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank com-
munication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and [the] admin-
istration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy de-
pends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.310
An assumption at work in this rationale is that clients will not be candid
and thus the legal advice rendered by the attorney will be less than sound
if the opposition can access communications between the attorney and
the client.31' The privilege allows for the free flow of information be-
tween attorney and client because the client is not fearful of such disclo-
sure.
Involving an ALF entity in attorney-client communications is nec-
essary to the rendering of sound legal advice in the general sense that the
ALF entity's involvement provides the funding that makes the legal ad-
vice possible. Yet, including an ALF entity is not necessary, in a more
specific sense, to ensure that the "full and frank communication between
312attorneys and their clients" occurs. ALF entities do not assist clients in
communicating with counsel and do not assist counsel in rendering
sound legal advice. Thus, extending the attorney-client privilege to ALF
entities is inconsistent with the rationale behind the attorney-client privi-
lege and is at odds with the accepted notion that the privilege should
remain narrow to limit its perhaps deleterious effect on truth finding.3 13
In addition, extending the privilege is not wise for the privilege's
health. Pulling the privilege away from its moorings, its rationale, means
that courts will become even more confused than they might already be
about when and how to apply it.3 14 Such confusion adds uncertainty to
the privilege's application. Uncertainty destroys the privilege's value.
The value of the privilege is that a client knows, at the time of communi-
310. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
311. For example, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), the Court noted
that "it seems quite plausible that [the client], perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have
sought legal advice from [the lawyer] if he had not been assured the conversation was privileged."
Id. at 408.
312. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
313. See discussion supra Part II.A.
314. More specifically, the common interest doctrine is already an amazing confusion and
would only suffer more by a recognition that an ALF entity shares a sufficient common interest at
the investment decision stage. See discussion supra Part III.A. Likewise, courts are confused by the
functional equivalent concept and when it should be used. See discussion supra Part IV.A. In addi-
tion, courts are uncertain about the appropriate reach of the Kovel agency doctrine. See discussion
supra Part IV.B.
141
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
cating, that the communication will be protected. Only with that certainty
does the privilege encourage "full and frank" disclosure to the attor-
ney.315 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the at-
torney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certain-
ty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all. 31
6
Stretching and modifying the attorney-client privilege and its subdoc-
trines to encompass communications involving ALF entities would not
be a positive development for the privilege itself.
CONCLUSION
ALF has become a reality in the United States in recent years. With
the growing popularity of ALfF and as perceived barriers have faded
away, the need for an understanding of the attorney-client privilege's
application to communications involving ALF entities has become ap-
parent.
While ALF entities could perhaps become joint clients of the lawyer
involved and thus share the privilege's protection, to date, they have not
sought joint client status. Even if ALF entities wanted to be joint clients
in the future, such a representation could not occur if the arrangement
yielded an ethically impermissible conflict of interest, a result very likely
in the relationship's investment decision stage and certainly possible in
the relationship's monitoring stage.
Nor is it likely that ALF entities can successfully claim privilege via
the allied party-common interest doctrine for communications in the rela-
tionship's investment decision stage. It is simply not likely that courts
will find that at that stage the litigating party and the ALF entity share an
appropriate common interest. While a claim of privilege based on a
common interest is more plausible with communications in the relation-
ship's monitoring stage, even with these communications, the privilege's
protection is uncertain because of the variety of standards applied by the
courts to this subdoctrine of the privilege.
Similarly, courts likely would not find communications involving
ALF entities to be protected by the privilege as a result of the functional
equivalent agent doctrine or the Kovel agency doctrine. Courts to date
315. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
316. Id. at 393; see also Giesel, supra note 74, at 502-03. Indeed, in Swidler & Berlin, the
Court refused to apply a balancing test to determine when the privilege might apply to the statements
of a dead client, stating that use of such a test "introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege's
application." Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409.
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have applied those doctrines in ways that would exclude communications
involving ALF entities from privilege protection.
While the existing attorney-client privilege may not protect com-
munications involving ALF entities, the privilege and its subdoctrines
should not be stretched to encompass the ALF scenario because to do so
is inconsistent with the privilege's rationale and will add uncertainty and
confusion to an area of the law that thrives when there is certainty. If the
presence of ALF entities in the United States' legal market creates a suf-
ficient benefit, and if that benefit cannot be captured if including ALF
entities in communications or revealing otherwise privileged communi-
cations destroys the application of the privilege, perhaps the best path is
to establish a free-standing privilege not dependent upon existing attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine.

